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Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law 
School 
	  




Consider the following hypothetical. Two law students recently completed 
their first year at a prestigious American law school. 
The first student, Anne, is a single mother of two young children, Erin and 
Max. Anne receives several loans that cover the majority of her law school 
fees, but must also work part-time to cover living expenses for herself and her 
children. As a single parent, Anne is solely responsible for raising and caring 
for Erin and Max. Anne completed her first year of law school with a B+ grade 
point average (GPA). 
The second student, Dan, is one year out of college and has no children. 
Dan’s parents have had successful careers and, fortunately for Dan, they have 
been prudent with their money. Dan’s parents were able to pay his college 
tuition and over half of his law school fees. He has taken out a few loans that 
cover the balance and provide more than enough for his living expenses. Dan 
completed his first year of law school with a B+ GPA. 
Now, imagine you oversee hiring at a prominent law firm. With one 
position left to fill, you receive applications from Anne and Dan. You must 
determine who will make the more talented attorney. Although a serious 
assessment may demand a deeper review, all you know about each student are 
their respective GPAs and general circumstances as described in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
Though imperfect for many reasons,1  law school GPA frequently serves 
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GPA in this way relies on the assumption that a similar GPA should 
communicate the same thing for each student. Based on this assumption, Anne 
and Dan’s respective GPAs would suggest that the students, at least in terms of 
legal talent, are quite similar. However, Anne’s route to a B+ was filled with 
obstacles that Dan never faced. Beyond studying and preparing for final exams, 
a baseline task common to all students, Anne divided her time between caring 
for her children and working a part-time job. Dan, in contrast, faced only the 
baseline task. 
Due  to  this  imbalance,  Anne’s  B+  is  arguably  more  impressive  than 
Dan’s. In other words, Dan was unable to out-perform Anne even with this 
advantage. Looking to GPA in the abstract clearly is not enough.  To account 
for this difference, proper reliance on GPA may require departing from an 
acontextual lens for one that recognizes the students’ distinct circumstances. 
Since adding this layer of context should facilitate an employer’s ability to 
accurately identify the more talented attorney, refining our reliance on GPA 
should ultimately promote meritocracy.3 
This hypothetical presents an example of unevenness. Unevenness refers 
to benefits and burdens that have nothing to do with an individual’s inherent 
ability, talent, or hustle. Rather, unevenness describes the presence of particular 
burdens that uniquely tax certain individuals in a given setting; other members 
of the community do not face these burdens. Above, Anne’s unique financial 
	  
	  
1.    Relying on standardized testing and grades as a proxy for academic ability has 
spurred various critiques. One area of critique cites growing findings that, as a result of stereotype 
threat, standardized tests systematically underestimate the academic ability of Black and Latino 
students. See Brief of Experimental Psychologists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Fisher v. University of Texas (August 13, 2012) (No. 01-1015); Jonathan Feingold, Racing 
Towards Colorblindness: Stereotype Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J. L. & MOD. 
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231 (2012); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A 
Behavioral Realist Revision of ‘Affirmative Action,’ 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063 (2006) [hereinafter 
Kang, Fair Measures]; Gregory Walton et al., Affirmative Meritocracy, SOC. ISS. POL. REV. (In 
Press) (estimating that given particular threat conditions, stereotype threat causes the under- 
measure of academic ability); Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades 
and Test Scores Systematically Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped 
Students, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132, 1137 (2009) (observing that as a result of stereotype threat, “the 
SAT Math and SAT Reading tests underestimate the intellectual ability of African and Hispanic 
Americans . . . by a total of 39-40 points,” which is significant considering the “Black-White and 
Hispanic-White gaps on the SAT (combining math and reading) are 199 and 148 points, 
respectively”). For alternative critiques of standardized testing, see, e.g., What’s Wrong with 
Standardized Tests, FAIRTEST (May 22, 2012, 9:26 PM), http://www.fairtest.org/facts/ 
whatwron.htm. 
2.   Beyond GPA, many employers will consider membership in law journals and 
participation on mock trial, moot court, or other extracurricular organizations and activities. As a 
result of her circumstances, it is likely that Anne has less time to participate in such endeavors. 
Dan, on the other hand, may be able to develop a resume full of such extracurriculars because he 
has no responsibilities beyond his personal performance in law school. 
3.    Cf. Kang & Banaji, Fair Measures, supra note 1 (discussing the potential for tie- 
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and familial responsibilities produced a particular unevenness. In a different 
context, unevenness would exist if one Olympic sprinter was forced to wear 
weighted clothing yet the other racers remained free to run in lightweight 
synthetic.4  The weighted clothing, by uniquely burdening the sprinter, creates 
the unevenness. A tie between the sprinter and another runner conceptually 
parallels the tie between Anne and Dan. Just as that tiebreaker would fall in 
Anne’s favor, accounting for the weighted clothing suggests that the sprinter is 
actually the faster runner. 
In this Article, we focus on racial unevenness and examine the common 
manifestations   of   racial   unevenness   in   American   law   schools.   Racial 
unevenness, which we introduce in Part I, refers to the presence of particular 
burdens that affect an individual solely because of her race. These burdens, 
which most often arise because an individual falls outside of the racial norm,5 
manifest across a spectrum. At one end lie obvious forms of overt and invidious 
racial discrimination. At the other end, racial unevenness arises from 
environmental  factors  and  institutional  culture  independent  from any 
identifiable perpetrator. As we detail below, race-dependent burdens can arise 
in institutions and communities that expressly promote racial diversity and 
condemn overt racial discrimination; good intentions are no panacea to racial 
unevenness.6 
Part II analyzes manifestations of racial unevenness common to American 




4.    Others have employed a track metaphor, in which a participant’s race, gender and 
socio-economic status correspond to a particular lane and its associated challenges. See AAPF’s 
Track Metaphor—The Unequal Opportunity Race, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM (Oct. 31, 
2012), http://aapf.org/tool_to_speak_out/track-metaphor-aminated-film/. Alternatively, imagine a 
sporting event in which only one player has to deal with a vociferous heckler. The heckler burdens 
one member of the group only, which creates the unevenness. As a policy matter, unevenness may 
not inherently necessitate an intervention. We are not arguing that stadiums should prohibit fans 
from yelling at athletes. However, we do believe that intervention is appropriate in law school 
when unevenness results from an individual characteristic such as race, gender or sexual 
orientation. These are not the factors that should determine law school’s winners and losers. 
5.    By “racial norm,” we refer to the racial group in a particular context that functions as 
the baseline from which difference is measured. Racial demographics and broader social and 
cultural elements interact to determine which race occupies this baseline position in a given 
situation. In the American context, whiteness remains the baseline; Whites remain numerical 
majorities in most spaces and racial difference is measured in terms of distance from whiteness. 
Due to this White baseline, racial unevenness in the United States most commonly burdens People 
of Color. Whites rarely bear the weight of this unevenness. 
6.    See infra Part I.B.ii (describing the multiple causes and manifestations of racial 
unevenness that are not the product of intentional discrimination). 
7.    For the majority of this Article, we break students into two groups: Students of Color 
and  White  students.  There  are  multiple  legitimate  concerns  with  such  a  framing.  Grouping 
Students of Color obscures the degree of difference and heterogeneity that exists across groups 
and leaves even less room to appreciate the differences within a single racial category. Writing in 
White versus non-White terms also risks perpetuating a White-centrist frame that reproduces 
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also contend with racial unevenness and its associated burdens. These burdens 
can produce intersecting harms and headwinds that span from emotional and 
mental anguish to academic underperformance.9 Because whiteness remains the 
baseline in nearly every major American law school,10  White students do not 
face  these  challenges.11    In  the  zero  sum  game  of  law  school,12    racial 
unevenness effectively privileges White students. However, with the wind at 
their backs, White students often fail to recognize this advantage.13 
Part III concludes with a detailed analysis of the Diversity Action 
Committee Survey on Diversity and Classroom Climate (DAC Survey), which 
law students administered at UCLA School of Law in the spring of 2012.  The 
DAC Survey constitutes one of the first attempts to measure racial unevenness 
in  law  school.  Relying  on  quantitative  and  qualitative  metrics,14   the  DAC 





disaggregate students in this manner to facilitate analyzing the DAC survey and, since White 
remains the baseline in the American racial regime, difference in law school is most often 
measured off of whiteness. 
8.    All students must deal with the normal challenges of law school, which include, 
inter alia, learning how to read an appellate opinion, dissect and understand a fact pattern, and 
fluently speak a new “legal” language. 
9.    See, e.g., Daniel Solórzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, 
and Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of African American College Students, 69 J. NEGRO 
EDUC.  60,  62  (2000)  (discussing  the  harms  associated  with  racially  hostile  environments, 
including psychological and mental anguish and feelings of stigmatization and marginalization); 
Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 271, 271 
(2007) (discussing harms associated with racial microaggressions); Walton & Spencer, supra note 
1 (discussing how stereotype threat, which is likely to arise in racially hostile environments, 
hinders Students of Color from demonstrating their true talent). 
10.    This  results  in  part  from  the  racial  composition  of  law  school  student  bodies, 
faculties and administrations. 
11. See generally Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School: 
Toward Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and 
Bar Passage, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 711 (2004) (discussing racial unevenness’s impact on 
academic outcomes in law school). 
12. Most law schools evaluate students on a curve. A curve prescribes that student’s 
grades, arguably the most determinant component of a law student’s dossier, are determined by 
the quality of that student’s work relative to all other students. 
13. See generally Tim Wise, Whites Swim in Racial Preference, ALTERNET (Feb. 20, 
2003), http://academic.udayton.edu/race/04needs/affirm20.htm. 
14.    This focus on racial unevenness should not be misunderstood as a claim that other 
dimensions of marginalization in law school (whether arising from axes of identity such as gender, 
sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, age, or religion) are unimportant or less important than 
that arising from race.  For the DAC Survey’s first administration, we chose to focus on race. 
Recognizing the limitations of any survey, we welcome and encourage further research that adds 
to this report.  For scholarship that has addressed other dimensions of unevenness in law school, 
see, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw,  Towards a  Race-Conscious  Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Angela Mae Kupenda, On Teaching Constitutional Law When My 
Race Is in Their Face, 21 LAW & INEQ. 215 (2003) (discussing the racial and gender unevenness 
faced by female faculty of color); Brad Sears, Queer L, NAT’L L.J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 234 
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undergraduate institutions,15  and gender unevenness at one elite law school.16 
Among other findings, the survey reveals that UCLA Law’s Students of Color 
face disproportionate levels of discrimination and marginalization when 
compared to their White counterparts. Whereas Students of Color cite race as 
central to their experience, White students overwhelmingly view race as a non- 
factor in their legal education. 
Before proceeding, we briefly quote from the Yale Law Women Speak Up 
Report, which is part of an ongoing effort to better understand the impact of 
gender  dynamics  at  Yale  Law  School.17   The  Report’s  authors  offer  the 
following thoughts: 
In our adversarial legal system, evidence is marshaled to win arguments 
and close cases. Speak Up and its thick record of quantitative and 
qualitative data are intended to do something different. We share this 
report with you to invigorate a conversation, not end it. We believe this is 
the best way to honor the hard work of our predecessors and move toward 
a  satisfying  future  for  everyone  in  our  community.  In  that  spirit  of 
openness, we invite you to read, to reflect, and of course, to speak up.18 
We present this Article and the DAC Survey in the same spirit. The DAC 
Survey is not the end of any conversation. It is only the beginning. If we are 
lucky, it will be the beginning of a long, ambitious and robust conversation 
about racial unevenness and corresponding interventions at UCLA Law and 
beyond. 
	  
I. RACIAL UNEVENNESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
	  
A.   Racial Unevenness – A Basic Definition 
	  
For most Americans, “racism” remains a loaded term. The word has the 
power to invoke powerful images of segregated schools, men in white hoods, 
burning crosses and the many other manifestations of overt and invidious racial 
discrimination that have plagued America. Due largely to changing national 




15.    See generally Shaun R. Harper & Sylvia Hurtado, Nine Themes in Campus Racial 
Climates and Implications for Institutional Transformation, RESPONDING TO THE REALITIES OF 
RACE ON CAMPUS: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES (S. R. Harper & L. D. Patton, eds. 
2007)  (discussing  fifteen  years  of  research  on  racially  hostile  learning  environments  on 
undergraduate campuses). 
16.    See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy 
League  Law  School,  143  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1  (1994)  (observing  how  gender  influenced  the 
experience of students at University of Pennsylvania Law School). 
17. Preface, YALE LAW WOMEN, YALE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY & STUDENTS SPEAK UP 
ABOUT GENDER: TEN YEARS LATER (2012). 
18. Id. 
19. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as 
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greatly declined.20 Notwithstanding this decline in overt discrimination, subtle 
forms of discriminatory treatment21 and environmental forces independent from 
conduct continue to exact unique burdens upon People of Color because of 
their race.22 But since these burdens are not the product of overt discrimination, 
unburdened individuals rarely recognize their presence and associated harm.23 
Counterintuitively, these new forms of covert racism are potentially more 
insidious than their overt predecessors.24 Their “invisible” nature coupled with 
our  traditional  understanding  of  racism  creates  challenges  for  those  who 
attempt   to   capture   and   analyze   these   modern   race-dependent   harms.25 
Confronting this challenge, scholars have developed concepts such as racial 
microaggressions  and  racial  climate  to  describe  and  expose  the  “subtle, 
nebulous, and unnamed nature” of modern racism and the way in which 
environmental  forces  affect  “the  educational  experiences  and  outcomes  of 
Students of Color.”26 Others, situated primarily within the tradition of Critical 
Race  Theory,  continue  to  interrogate  the  way  in  which  implicit  biases,27 
	  
	  
20.    Even  in  the  absence  of  overt  and  intentional  discrimination,  if  we  define 
discrimination as occurring anytime a perceiver treats a target in a particular way because of the 
target’s race, there remains strong evidence that discriminatory treatment continues to exist. See 
Kang, Fair Measures, supra note 1; Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: 
Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) [hereinafter Kang, Trojan Horses]. 
21.    See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 271 (“[R]acism (a) is more likely than ever to be 
disguised and covert and (b) has evolved from the ‘old fashioned’ form, in which overt racial 
hatred and bigotry consciously and publicly displayed, to a more ambiguous and nebulous form 
that is more difficult to identify and acknowledge.”). 
22. See infra Part I.B.ii.3 (discussing the impact of stereotype threat and other burdens 
that arise from environmental factors). As early as 1974, psychologist Chester Pierce implored 
that “one must not look for the gross and obvious. The subtle, cumulative miniassault is the 
substance of today’s racism.”  Chester M. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in 
AMER. HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 516 (S. Arieti ed. 1974). 
23. This  invisibility  should  not  necessarily  surprise  us.  President  Clinton’s  Race 
Advisory  Board  concluded  that,  inter  alia,  many  White  Americans  remain  unaware  of  the 
privilege they enjoy in America and how their behavior discriminates against People of Color. See 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN ET AL., PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (1998), available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica/PIR.pdf. 
24.    See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1745, 1752 (1989) (“[A]lthough the overt forms of racial domination described thus far were 
enormously destructive, covert color bars have been, in a certain sense, even more insidious. After 
all, judgments based on expressly racist criteria make no pretences about evaluating the merit of 
the individual’s work. Far more cruel are racially prejudiced judgments that are rationalized in 
terms of meritocratic standards.”); Solórzano, supra note 9, at 60–73; Derald Wing Sue, 
OVERCOMING OUR RACISM: THE JOURNEY TO LIBERATION (2003) (“The ‘new’ manifestation of 
racism has been likened to carbon monoxide, invisible, but potentially lethal.”). 
25. Scholars have noted that “[w]ithout an adequate classification or understanding of 
the dynamics of subtle racism, it will remain invisible and potentially harmful to the well-being, 
self-esteem, and standard of living of people of color.” Sue et al., supra note 9, at 272. 
26. Id.; Solórzano, supra note 9, at 16. 
27.   See generally Kang, Fair Measures, supra note 1; Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal 
Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPERICAL LEGAL STUD. 886 
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institutional and societal forces28 and identity,29 among other things, perpetuate 
racial oppression in the America. Joining this work, we introduce racial 
unevenness as a concept that will help us understand and unveil how race 
remains embedded in our institutions and our daily lives. 
At a basic level, racial unevenness refers to the presence of any burden 
that arises solely because of a person’s race. Had this person belonged to a 
different race, she would not have confronted this burden. Relevant burdens 
range from the most overt racism to the far more difficult to identify, subtle and 
seemingly mundane harms unattributable to any perpetrator.30 Since only some 
members within a community bear the weight of racial unevenness, it functions 
as a racial tax.31  In American society, People of Color most often bear this 
tax;32 it is a tax Whites almost never have to pay. 
When    discussing    racial    unevenness,    we    employ    “raced”    and 
“race-normed” to differentiate between the individuals that do and do not bear 
the burden of unevenness in a given setting. The notion of “racing” is derived 
from Jerry Kang’s model of racial mechanics.33  Under Kang’s model, race is 
the product of a series of processes. The first step consists of an encounter 
involving a perceiver and a target; the perceiver relies on a set of mapping rules 
and  racial  schemas  to  map  the  target  into  a  particular  racial  category.34 
Schemas, which guide this mapping, are mental “templates of knowledge that 
help us organize specific examples into broader categories.”35 For instance, at a 
young age we learn to recognize “something with a seat, back, and legs . . . as a 





28. See, e.g., Devon M. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1259 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado, Working Identity]; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (1993). 
29.   See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (introducing the 
concept of intersectionality); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093 (2008). 
30.    Such  moments  and  the  ensuing  negative  consequences  can  result  from  good 
intentions. See Cecil J. Hunt, Guests in Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar 
Performance, 23 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 771–72 (1996) (describing a faculty member’s decision 
not to call on Students of Color because of the students’ perceived vulnerability). 
31. Cf. Claude M. Steele, Expert Report, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/steele.html (“[Stereotype-threatened 
students] pay an extra tax on their investment there, a ‘pioneer tax,’ if you will, of worry and 
vigilance that their futures will be compromised by the ways society perceives and treats their 
group. And it is paid everyday, in every stereotype-relevant situation.”). 
32. Id. 
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Such processes enable us to constantly digest large quantities of information 
without expending too many cognitive resources.38 
Schemas apply to most things we encounter in our lives, such as other 
human beings. As with a chair, a set of mapping rules helps us subconsciously 
identify and categorize people. Instead of cuing on a seat, back, and legs, 
placement in racial categories depends on characteristics such as phenotype, 
accent, or skin color.39 Once mapped into a particular racial category, presence 
in that category triggers an associated racial meaning.40  Racial meanings can 
take the form of stereotypes or attitudes.41  A stereotype involves particular 
traits that we associate with a racial group, such as foreign, criminal, or good at 
math.42 An attitude involves an evaluative feeling about a group, such as like, 
dislike,  fear,  or  admiration.43   While  related,  attitudes  and  stereotypes  are 
distinct. For instance, a person may hold positive stereotypes about Asians and 
math but simultaneously hold a negative attitude about the racial group. The 
particular racial meaning ultimately affects the perceiver’s behavior vis-à-vis 
the target. 
By describing only some individuals as raced, we depart slightly from this 
model. As described above, due to racial schemas, all people are mapped into a 
particular racial group, which then triggers associated racial meaning. We 
contrast “raced” with “race-normed” to emphasize that the burdens associated 
with racial unevenness most often arise as a result of an individual’s distance 
from the racial norm. In situations where whiteness is the norm, White 
individuals are still mapped (or raced) into a racial category. However, there is 
no burden associated with this mapping because it occurs with respect to a 
White baseline (i.e. White is normal). It is as if the White individual has no 
race, a phenomenon often referred to as white transparency.44  For this reason, 
we refer to Whites in such contexts as race-normed. By contrast, the moment 
someone is mapped into a non-White racial group, that distance from the racial 
norm has the potential to create an incipient burden, or unevenness. A Person 
of Color is thereby raced. 
Whiteness is not inherently the racial baseline. Depending on context, 
racial unevenness sometimes manifests in a way that burdens Whites. For 
instance, within a college class on Asian Studies, with an Asian-American 





38. See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 20. 





44. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness 
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normed and non-Asians may be raced.45 The NBA, where blackness is arguably 
the  norm,  provides  another  example.  In  such  a  space,  a  White  or  Asian 
basketball player is vulnerable to race-dependent challenges that his Black 
teammates may never face. One recent example is Jeremy Lin, who became the 
fourth  Asian-American  to  play in  the  NBA 2010.46  The  media  thoroughly 
commented on the race-dependent burdens Lin faced during his tenure with the 
New York Knicks in 2012.47 
Racial unevenness and its effect on students is complicated by the often 
complex and multifaceted nature of identity. Beyond race, unevenness arises as 
a  result  of  characteristics  such  as  gender,  sexual  orientation  and  socio- 
economic status. An individual’s identity in any of these social categories could 
create particular burdens unrelated to her inherent talent or abilities. Due to the 
intersectional nature  of our identities,  many of  us  may simultaneously fall 
within and outside of the norm. Constant across each domain, the particular 
form of unevenness results from distance from the norm, whether it is male, 
straight or middle-class. Ultimately, any unevenness proceeds with the same 
logic: Assuming all other characteristics are equal, difference along a particular 






45.    Claude Steele provides a similar example of a White student in an African-American 
political science class. Within this particular space, where blackness was arguably the baseline as 
a result of the overwhelming majority of Black students and the substance of the curriculum, the 
White student acutely felt the weight and presence of his race in a way that did not occur in other 
classrooms. See CLAUDE STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW 
STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 85–89 (2010) [hereinafter STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI]. In either 
example, societal stereotypes about Asian or Black students could still penetrate the interior of the 
classroom and impact behavior and perceptions. Still, the presence of a large majority of Asian- 
American or Black students and an explicitly Asian-centric or African-American-centric 
curriculum would likely be sufficient to shift the default racial norm away from its White baseline. 
46. See, e.g., Asian American – Sports – Basketball, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_American (last visited March 3, 2013); Devin Gordon, The 
Jeremy Lin Debate No One Wants to Have, GQ.COM  (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.gq.com/blogs/the-q/2012/07/the-jeremy-lin-debate-no-one-wants-to-have.html; Devin 
Gordon, Jeremy Lin, Carmelo Anthony and Race: An Alternate Viewpoint, GQ.COM  (July 20, 
2012),               http://www.gq.com/blogs/the-q/2012/07/jeremy-lin-carmelo-anthony-and-race-an- 
alternate-viewpoint.html; Jay Caspian Kang, A Question of Identity: The headline, the tweet, and 
the unfair significance of Jeremy Lin, GRANTLAND (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/7601157/the-headline-tweet-unfair-significance-jeremy-lin. 
47.    Some may argue that if racial unevenness compels a racial remedy (i.e. affirmative 
action) in certain contexts, then intellectual consistency demands that we support race- 
consciousness “admissions” in the NBA (or hypothetically in a mathematics doctoral program 
where Asian students outnumber Whites). Although racial unevenness may burden Whites to a 
certain degree in these settings, the situations are not parallel. For instance, whereas People of 
Color faced explicitly discriminatory policies that formally limited their ability to access 
institutions such as the NBA and higher education, Whites have rarely faced formal or informal 
exclusion in the United States. This distinction, among others, cautions against assuming that the 
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B.   Racial Unevenness – A Taxonomy 
	  
All manifestations of racial unevenness exist at a particular point within 
two, at times overlapping, spheres. The first sphere comprises all forms of 
racial unevenness that arise when an individual is treated differently by another 
person, group, or institution because of her race. The second sphere, in contrast, 
encompasses manifestations of racial unevenness that arise from environmental 
factors and institutional culture in the absence of disparate treatment. 
This disaggregation of racial unevenness maps closely onto established 
models of discrimination that distinguish between disparate treatment and 
disparate impact.48 Under these traditional models, disparate treatment exists 
anytime a perpetrator treats a victim differently because of the victim’s race.49 
The unlawful harm is the perpetrator’s discriminatory behavior, which is 
motivated by invidious, as opposed to rational, non-racist grounds.50 Disparate 
impact, in contrast, exists whenever there is a disparate racial outcome.51  The 
harm  is  the  disparity  itself,  unrelated  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  an 
identifiable perpetrator.52 
Though similar, our formulation of racial unevenness diverges slightly 
from these past models. Formally, the disparate treatment sphere of racial 
unevenness  is  identical  to  that  described  above.  However,  by  including 
behavior that results from implicit bias (e.g. “unintentional” discriminatory 
treatment), our disparate treatment sphere extends beyond traditional 
articulations of disparate treatment that demand evidence of an “intentional” 
act. 
Racial   unevenness’s   second   sphere   encompasses   a   space   that   is 
simultaneously broader and narrower than traditional articulations of disparate 
	  
	  
48.    Disparate treatment theory formally entered the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that cognizable equal 
protection claims required a showing of discriminatory intent even in the presence of profound 
disparate impact). Prior to Davis, the Supreme Court had recognized cognizable Title VII claims 
of discrimination in the absence of discriminatory intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 432 (1971) (“The Company’s lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by special efforts to 
help the undereducated employees through Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for 
high school training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”) (emphasis omitted). 
49.    Alan Freeman has described this conception of discrimination as the “perpetrator 
perspective” because of the prerequisite existence of an identifiable perpetrator. See Alan David 
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review 
of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
50. See Laurence H. Tribe, Making Sense of the Equal Protection Clause: A Right Not to 
Be Subjugated, AM. CONST. L. 1514, 1515 (2d ed. 1988). 
51.    Disparate impact theory has alternatively been described as the “anti-subjugation 
theory” and “victim perspective.” Although all slightly nuanced, each model of discrimination 
focuses  on  the  victim’s  experience  and  recognizes  race-based  harm  in  the  absence  of  an 
identifiable perpetrator. 
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impact. It is broader because race-dependent burdens can exist even in the 
absence of racially disparate outcomes. Students of Color, for instance, could 
be just as successful as their White counterparts even in the presence of race- 
dependent burdens. The second sphere is simultaneously narrower because the 
presence of a racially disparate outcome does not guarantee the presence of 
racial unevenness. This mismatch arises because racial unevenness, as we have 
defined it, refers to race-dependent burdens at the individual level.53 Even if no 
such burdens exist, a disparate outcome could conceivably arise. Still, in most 
instances   individual   experiences   will   track   group   outcomes.   Disparate 
outcomes therefore provide relevant evidence of race-dependent burdens, and 
thus racial unevenness. By focusing on the burden at the level of the individual, 
as opposed to its cause or group-wide effect, the second sphere maps more 
closely onto a “victim”54  or “anti-subordination”55  perspective, both of which 
conceive of discrimination in terms of harm suffered. 
	  
1.   Disparate Treatment: Intentional and Unintentional Discrimination 
As described above, racial unevenness’s first sphere encompasses burdens 
that arise from disparate treatment by another person, group, or institution. 
Disparate treatment arises in various ways, spanning interpersonal interactions 
to institutional policies or practices. Although we often understand 
discrimination in terms of negative treatment, racial unevenness exists even if 
the race-dependent treatment is positive.   This “boost,” by privileging some 
individuals over others because of their race, creates a race-dependent burden.56 
And since racial unevenness refers to race-dependent harm, disparate 
treatment is problematic regardless of the perpetrator’s underlying intent; racial 
unevenness exists whether or not it is the product of intentional and invidious, 
or unintentional and subconscious, behavior. To differentiate between these 
forms of disparate treatment, we focus on whether explicit or implicit bias 
caused the underlying discriminatory act. 
Explicit and implicit biases arise from social cognitions.57 A cognition is a 
thought or feeling, and “a social cognition is a thought or feeling about a person 
or a social group, such as a racial group.”58 In our daily lives, most social 
cognitions are implicit, which means they subconsciously and instantaneously 
enter our minds.59  Cognitions are the product of racial schemas. As discussed 
	  
	  
53.    This is not to say that racial unevenness does not also operate at the group level. For 
purposes of this Article, however, we narrow our lens to manifestations of racial unevenness at the 
level of the individual. 
54. See Freeman, supra note 49. 
55. See Tribe, supra note 50, at 1515. 
56. See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 20. 
57. See id. at 887; Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1124, 1128 (2012) [hereinafter Kang, Implicit Bias]. 
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above, racial schemas allow us to quickly process large amounts of information 
by organizing particular things or people into broader categories.60 As a result 
of racial schemas and implicit cognitions, we automatically place individuals 
into racial categories that trigger associated attitudes and stereotypes.61 
“Explicit” connotes that the cognition is “consciously accessible through 
introspection and endorsed as appropriate by the person who possesses” it.62 
Salient examples of behavior arising from explicit bias include Jim Crow laws, 
Japanese Internment, racially motivated hate crimes, racially restrictive housing 
covenants, and voter gerrymandering.63 In each instance, the decision maker 
(perceiver) is consciously treating one group differently than another because 
of race. Most often, the perceiver endorses the stereotype or attitude driving the 
decision. Historically, models of human behavior presumed that our attitudes 
and stereotypes about racial groups were the product of these explicit biases.64 
Implicit biases, in contrast, comprise attitudes and stereotypes that are 
inaccessible through self-inspection.65 The perceiver, who may not endorse the 
stereotype or attitude if made aware of its existence, is often unaware of, or 
mistaken about, the source of the bias and its influence on behavior.66 We may 
honestly believe that we view a particular group positively without realizing 
that  we  implicitly  hold  negative  attitudes  or  stereotypes  about  that  same 







62. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 57, at 1129. 
63.    We categorize these examples as the product of explicit bias because the relevant 
decisions  makers  would  be  able  to  identify  the  racially  inflected  motivations  driving  their 
behavior. In upholding the curfew and exclusion of Japanese Americans, for instance, the Court 
never claimed an absence of intentional discrimination.   Rather, the Court consistently 
differentiated between presumptively unconstitutional racial antagonism (understood as pure, 
irrational racial hostility) and a more lawful “common sense” racial profiling. See Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their 
ancestry  are  by  their  very  nature  odious  to  a  free  people . . .  For  that  reason,  legislative 
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal 
protection. We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the 
fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls 
upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations 
in the danger areas.”); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (“To cast this case 
into the outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were 
presented merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because 
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire 
. .  .”). 
64. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 57, at 1129. 
65. See id. at 1129–31. 
66. See Kang, Are Ideal Litigators White?, supra note 37, at 887. 
67. See id.; cf. Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias, 
59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 210 (2012) (discussing how we may be unaware of our own biases, yet 
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conceptions of disparate treatment that account for intentional discrimination 
only fail to embody the entire breadth of race-dependent treatment.68 
	  
2.   Institutional Culture and Perceiver Effects 
Racial unevenness’s second sphere, which we generally refer to as 
institutional culture, comprises all race-dependent burdens that are not a 
consequence of disparate treatment. These forms of racial unevenness can arise 
from  personal  interactions,  but  are  also  commonly  the  product  of 
environmental factors. Since environmental factors will change across settings, 
racial unevenness could vary within a single institution.69 
Arising from scholarship concerning the relationship between institutional 
forces and the experience of Students of Color in higher education, the term 
“campus racial climate”70  has emerged to describe the degree to which 
institutions provide welcoming spaces in which Students of Color feel like 
equal members of the campus community.71  The presence of a positive racial 
climate  reduces  racial  unevenness  and  positively  impacts  the  academic 
outcomes of Students of Color.72 In contrast, a racially hostile climate can 
exacerbate  racial  unevenness  and  contribute  to  the  mental  anguish  and 
academic underperformance of Students of Color.73  Presence in such an 
environment has been described as being a “guest in another’s house,”74 a 
metaphor that reflects how Students of Color, although putative equals to their 
White counterparts, may feel that they “are not actually treated as legitimate 








68. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 57. 
69.    For   instance,   even   across   classrooms   the   particular   manifestation   of   racial 
unevenness likely depends on the race of the instructor, the racial composition of the students and 
the subject matter of the course. While Latino students may normally feel particular burdens in a 
first-year property course, racial unevenness may shift to a White student who finds herself as a 
token in a class on Latinos and the law. 
70. See generally Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15 (conducting a meta-analysis on 
campus racial climate research gathered between 1992 and 2007). 
71. Solórzano, supra note 9, at 62. 
72. See id. at 63. 
73.    Id. This use of the term “hostile” to describe negative campus racial environments 
does suggest that such institutions intentionally create uninviting environments. The phrase is a 
term of art that describes experience, not intentions or motives. As suggested by DAC Survey’s 
finding, see infra Part III, racially hostile climates may exist even at institutions  that actively 
attempt to create a positive racial climate. 
74. Hunt, supra note 30, at 774. 
75. Id.; see also Walter Allen & Daniel Solórzano,  Affirmative Action, Educational 
Equity and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12 
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A multitude of factors impact an institution’s campus racial climate, none 
of which are independently determinative.76  Relevant factors include: (1) 
personal interactions; (2) the racial composition of students, faculty and 
administrators; (3) the degree to which People of Color are included in campus 
activities; (4) the institution’s commitment to diversity and pluralism; (5) 
responsiveness to the needs and concerns of Students of Color; (6) the breadth 
of courses offered, (7) the general ideological disposition of members of the 
community; and (7) the physical space (including decorations and images on 
the wall).77 Internal contradictions also have the ability to impact campus racial 
climate. For instance, even though formally rejected, lingering and pervasive 
stereotypes regarding the intellectual inferiority of Students of Color, especially 
Black and Latina/o students, remain prominent at many institutions.78 In the 
presence of such stereotypes, racial unevenness can become particularly acute 
when an institution’s claim and self-presentation of racial inclusiveness is 
juxtaposed with a failure to adequately address student concerns. 
	  
(1)  Racial Demographics 
Since an institution’s racial composition affects the racial norm, a law 
school’s racial demographics will directly impact levels of racial unevenness, 
and as a consequence, students’ experience. Students of Color remain 
underrepresented in most elite American law schools, which remain more than 
60% White.79 In such institutions, which continue to house large majorities of 
White male faculty and administrators, particular classrooms may contain no 
more than one or two Students of Color. For these students, simply existing as a 





76. See Daniel G. Solórzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions and 
Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 
15, 16 (2002). 
77.    See  Tara  J.  Yosso  et  al.,  Critical  Race  Theory,  Racial  Microaggressions,  and 
Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDU. REV. 659, 672 (2009) 
(“Students’ physical world also elicits cultural alienation, featuring campus sculptures, buildings, 
flyers, and office postings that do not reflect Chicana/o histories or experiences. The cars and 
clothes of the predominately White student body further evidence the physical reproduction of 
White middle-class culture.”). 
78. Id.; cf. RICHARD  HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE  (1994); 
Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004). 
79.    Admissions statistics as reported on law schools’ websites. See, e.g., HLS Profile 
and Facts, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/prospective/jd/apply/classprofile.html (reporting 39% Students of 
Color for class of 2015); Admissions, YALE LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 7, 2012), 
http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/admissions.htm  (reporting 32% Students of Color for class 
of 2015); J.D. Admissions – Experience, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 7, 2012) 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/admissions/jd/experience/class-profile  (reporting 38% Students of 
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never confront.80  The experience of existing as a token has been described in 
the following way: 
A is the only Black student taking Medieval Literature; he is likely to feel 
like, and to be perceived as, “the Black kid” in the class. When B is the only 
woman majoring in Mechanical Engineering, she is likely to feel like, and to be 
perceived as, not just an Engineering major, but a woman majoring in 
Engineering. But when there are multiple members of one’s racial or gender 
group present, a person’s identity is less defined by group membership. Now A 
is just a student taking Medieval Literature and B is just someone studying 
Engineering.81 
This   description   reflects   tokenism’s   most   common   consequences: 
distortion  of  individual characteristics,  racial polarization,  and  super- 
visibility.82 Distortion refers to the tendency of majority group members to 
impose stereotypes on minority group members while simultaneously failing to 
accept behavior that challenges stereotypes.83 The related phenomenon of 
polarization   refers   to   increased   salience   gained   by   characteristics   that 
distinguish minority and majority group members even when such factors have 
little   connection   to   task   performance.84     Super-visibility   refers   to   the 
phenomenon whereby tokens are “over-observed.”85 
In the law school context, super-visibility manifests as a double-edged 
sword; token status produces the dual phenomena of hyper-invisibility and 
hyper-visibility.86   Similar to other forms of racial unevenness, although hyper- 
invisibility and hyper-visibility is obvious to the person bearing its burden, 
race-normed members of the class are rarely cognizant of such a phenomenon 
until it is explicitly marked.87 
Hyper-invisibility refers to the majority of class conversations in which 
the professor and fellow (i.e. White) students act as if the Student of Color is 
	  
	  
80.    See,  e.g.,  Eve  Spangler  et  al.,  Token  Woken:  An  Empirical  Test  of  Kanter’s 
Hypothesis, 84 AM. J. SOC. 160 (1978); Leonard Springer et al., Effects of Small-Group Learning 
on Undergraduates in Science, Mathematics, Engineering, and Technology: A Meta-Analysis, 69 
REV. EDU. RESEARCH 21 (1999); Egbert Harskamp et al., Group Composition and Its Effect on 
Female and Male Problem-Solving in Science Education, 50 EDU. RESEARCH 307 (2008); see 
also  William J. McGuire et al.,  Salience  of Ethnicity  in  the  Spontaneous  Self-Concept as a 
Function of One’s Ethnic Distinctiveness in the Social Environment, 36 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
511 (1978). 
81. See  Brief  of  Experimental  Psychologists.  et  al.  as  Amici  Curiae  Supporting 
Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas (August 13, 2012) (No. 01-1015). 
82. See Spangler, supra note 80, at 162. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 161. 
86.    See generally Rita Sethi, Speaking Up! Speaking Out! The Power of Student Speech 
in Law School Classrooms, 16 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 61, 63 (1994); Spangler, supra note 81, at 
162. 
87. See generally Sethi, supra note 86. Personal conversations commonly reveal that 
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not present.88 Invisibility likely arises in part from lingering stereotypes about 
Black and Latino intellectual ability. Whether explicit or implicit, these biases 
manifest  when  a  professor  fails  to  actively  solicit  substantive  input  from 
Students of Color. Even if avoidance is not the product of malice or explicit 
biases, failure to engage students on an equal basis can be perceived as 
demeaning  and  presumptive  behavior  that communicates that the  professor 
does not value each student’s contribution equally.89 
Juxtaposed with hyper-invisibility, hyper-visibility refers to the attention 
placed on Students of Color when race explicitly enters a conversation.90 Such 
moments, in which all eyes seemingly turn to the Student of Color, produce 
intersecting harms and a related “spokesperson pressure.”91   First, the student’s 
ability to be heard as an individual is buried beneath the expectation that they 
will speak on behalf of an entire group.92 Second, seeking input on “racial” 
issues only communicates that the student’s contributions are limited to 
discussions about race (the student’s apparent area of expertise).   Third, 
regarding race as relevant only when directly invoked suggests that race is not 
otherwise present or relevant to classroom discussions, a view that may conflict 
with a student’s life experience.93 
	  
(2)   Perceptive Divergence 
Two individuals can occupy the same space and witness the same events, 




88.    See  Solórzano,  supra  note  9,  at  65  (observing  that  African  American  students 
discussed feeling “invisible” in the classroom); see also Quaylan Allen, Racial Microaggressions: 
The Schooling Experiences of Black Middle-Class Males in Arizona’s Secondary Schools, 1 J. 
AFR. AM. MALES EDU.125, 130 (2010) (discussing hyper-invisibility and the experience of middle 
class Black males in high school). 
89. Hunt, supra note 30, at 774. 
90.    See Solórzano, supra note 9, at 27 (discussing a black student’s experience on the 
UC-Berkeley undergraduate campus: “I am the only Black student in the classroom, a Black issue 
comes  up  and  I  feel  all  eyes  on  me.  They  expect  me  to  be  their  expert  on  Black  people! 
Sometimes I have to remind them that I had gone to the same White school system they went to, 
and wasn’t taught about our history or psychology or anything. Just because I am black, they 
expect that I know all about the African American experience”). 
91. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). 
92. Solórzano, supra note 9, at 69. 
93.   Id. at 69–70; Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How 
Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. 
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) 
94. Cf. Claude M. Steele,  A Threat in the Air, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 613 (1997) 
[hereinafter Steele, A Threat in the Air] (“From an observer’s standpoint, the situations of a boy 
and a girl in a  math classroom or of a Black student and a White student in any classroom are 
essentially the same. The teacher is the same; the textbooks are the same; and in better classrooms, 
these students are treated the same. Is it possible, then, that they could still experience the 
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reality is often the reflection of perceptive divergence,95  whereby raced 
individuals are more likely than race-normed individuals to be self-conscious of 
their own race, view their own race as relevant to others’ perceptions of them, 
and attribute race as a cause underlying a particular event.96  Independent of 
actual disparate treatment, this heightened perception of race’s relevance is 
sufficient to produce and exacerbate feelings of isolation, alienation, and 
negative  campus  climate.97   For  raced  students  at  highly  competitive  law 
schools, the burdens flowing from perceptive divergence constitute another 
unique hurdle that their race-normed counterparts never face. 
Perceptive divergence could be understood in various ways.  First, it could 
be   evidence   that   raced   individuals   are   better   than   their   race-normed 
counterparts at identifying racial bias.98   Under this view, which invokes claims 
that  those  “on  the  bottom”  have  special  and  distinct  insights  about  the 
oppression they face, there is no difference between perceptive divergence and 
disparate treatment; perceptive divergence simply reflects raced individuals’ 
better “racial bias-radar.”   Alternatively, perceptive divergence could be 
evidence that raced individuals are oversensitive and inaccurately attribute race 
to otherwise race-neutral events. Under this interpretation, the better “racial 
bias-radar” belongs to race-normed individuals. 
These dueling interpretations, by framing perceptive divergence as a 
reflection of better or worse measures of objective reality, misdiagnose the 
relevance of perceptive divergence. Perceptive harms, which are most likely to 
afflict raced individuals, do not disappear simply because an individual 
inaccurately  interprets  an  incident  to  be  the  product  of  racial  bias.  The 
perception of racial bias can produce a burden in itself, regardless of its basis in 
“objective” truth.  The two framings, therefore, are somewhat inapposite to the 
more fundamental question of whether or not a race-dependent harm exists. 
As previously mentioned, heightened racial self-consciousness forms the 
core of perceptive divergence. This burden, which commonly manifest as 
perceived hyper-visibility, is most likely to afflict raced individuals because 
	  
	  
95.   Our conception of perceptive divergence tracks closely to Russell Robinson’s 
articulation of perceptual segregation. See Robinson, supra note 29 (discussing how racial and 
gender identities influence the way people perceive a moment of alleged discrimination). 
96.   Perceptive divergence can also arise when two people learn about a past incident. See 
Robert S. Chang, Toward An Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post- 
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1274 n.153 (“I have noticed that 
responses tended to vary depending on the gender and race of the listener. From my own 
unscientific observations, I recognized that stories were often better received by people of color 
and by women than by white men.”). 
97.    See Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 13. Perceptions about racial climate have 
been shown to affect students’ sense of belonging into their junior year of college. See Sylvia 
Hurtado & Deborah F. Carter, Effects of College Transition and Perceptions of the Campus Racial 
Climate on Latino College Students’ Sense of Belonging, 70 SOC. EDU. 324 (1997). 
98. Cf. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 
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they fall outside of the racial norm. Although interpersonal interaction can 
exacerbate racial self-consciousness, it is not a necessary predicate. Mere 
presence as a racial other is often sufficient. Most readers can recall such an 
experience.99 For some, especially People of Color living in the United States, 
this may be a daily occurrence. For others, principally White Americans who 
spend little time in spaces where Whites constitute a minority, it may be less 
common. In fact, unless their own race is directly marked, race-normed 
individuals are unlikely to ever experience racial self-consciousness. 
The severity and impact of heightened racial self-consciousness depend 
on many of the same factors that impact racial climate, such as a group’s racial 
composition and the stereotypes that attach to the raced individual. Perceptive 
divergence therefore will not impact Students of Color uniformly just because 
they fall outside of the racial norm. The most salient stereotypes that attach to 
Black and Latino students differ from those that attach to Asian students. As a 
result, performance pressures and self-awareness may correspondingly differ. 
Although  Asian  students  may  face  stereotypes  of  foreignness  or  passivity, 
Black and Latino students are more likely to battle a presumption of intellectual 
inferiority. The presence of either stereotype may produce feelings of 
marginalization and a depressed sense of belonging, but stereotypes affecting 
Black and Latino students are more likely to erode students’ confidence in their 
academic abilities.100  And even within a particular racial group, intra-group 
differences   will   impact   the   degree   to   which   heightened   racial   self- 
consciousness burdens any individual.101 
Beyond heightened racial self-consciousness, raced individuals are more 
likely than their race-normed counterparts to perceive race as a causal factor 
underlying negative interactions. This phenomenon—the tendency to attribute a 
racial cause to a negative interaction—is known as stigma consciousness.102 




99.    We imagine that many readers will be familiar with the phenomenon of heightened 
racial self-consciousness. For those who are not, we recommend spending a few hours someplace 
where you are a racial minority. You will likely be acutely aware of your race; this is the other 
side of perceptive divergence. 
100. See Solórzano, supra note 9, at 66; Sylvia Hurtado et al., Latino Student Transition 
to College, 37 RES. HIGHER EDU. 135, 152 (1996) (“Even the most talented Latinos are likely to 
have difficulty adjusting if they perceive a climate where majority students think all minorities are 
special admits [and] Hispanics feel like they do not ‘fit in.’ . . . Students may internalize these 
climate observations, presumably because these are more difficult to identify or sanction than 
overt forms of discrimination.”); Sharon Fries-Britt & Bridget Turner, Facing Stereotypes: A Case 
Study of Black Students on a White Campus, 42 J. COLLEGE STUDENT DEV. 420 (2001). 
101.    An individual’s “blackness,” for instance, may impact her ability to combat and 
maneuver through mechanisms of racial unevenness within an institution. See Devon W. Carbado 
& G. Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When they Get 
There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643 (2004); Carbado, Working Identity, supra note 28. 
102.    Elizabeth Pinel et al., Getting There Is Only Half the Battle: Stigma Consciousness 
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how strongly raced students believe such stereotypes inform their interactions 
with out-group individuals.103 When stigma consciousness is high, Students of 
Color are more likely than their White peers to perceive their institutions to be 
racist and to associate feelings of alienation on campus with racial prejudice 
and discrimination.104  Even when White students are aware of racial hostility 
on campus, Students of Color tend to view campus climate more negatively.105 
Since racial unevenness is likely to differ across racial groups, stigma 
consciousness and perceptions of campus racial climate are likely to similarly 
diverge.106 
Heightened levels of stigma consciousness will also impact a student’s 
ability to contend with racial microaggressions, which constitute the “brief, 
everyday exchanges that send denigrating messages to people of color because 
they belong to a racial minority group.”107 Since microaggressions are subtle in 







104.    See Sylvia Hurtado, The Campus Racial Climate: Contexts of Climate, 63 J. HIGHER 
EDU. 539, 546 (1992) (citing a study in which only 28% of Black and Chicano students perceived 
the university as being supportive of minority students, while 68% of White students agreed that it 
was); see also Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 12 (citing S. R. Rankin & R. D. Reason, 
Differing  Perceptions:  How  Students  of  Color  and  White  Students  Perceive  Campus  Racial 
Climate for Underrepresented Groups, 46 J. COLLEGE STUDENT DEV. 43 (2005)). In one 1993 
study, contrary to the majority of sampled White students, “[a]lmost all of the sampled African 
American students reported having borne the brunt of racist remarks and most assumed that 
African Americans would be mistreated on campus.” Id. (citing Anthony R. D’Augelli & Scott L. 
Hershberger, African American Undergraduates on a Predominantly White Campues: Academic 
Factors, Social Networks, and Campus Climate, 62 J. NEGRO EDU. 67, 77 (1993)). 
105.    See Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 12 (citing A. F. Cabrera & A. Nora, College 
Students’ Perceptions of Prejudice and Discrimination and Their Feelings of Alienation: A 
Construct Validation Approach, 16 REV. EDU./PEDAGOGY/CULTURAL STUD. 387 (1994); see also 
Janet K. Swim et al., African American College Students’ Experiences with Everyday Racism: 
Characteristics of and Responses to These Incidents, 29 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 38 (2003) (observing 
that 36% of participants reported unfriendly looks and skeptical stares, 24% percent reported 
confronting derogatory and stereotypical verbal remarks, 18% reported bad service received in 
settings on and off campus, and 15% reported other assorted incidents, including general rudeness 
and awkward or nervous behavior on the part of Whites; with students attributing the foregoing 
experiences to racism). 
106. Hurtado, supra note 100, at 546 (highlighting a study that found that “Black students 
were most likely to perceive a hostile racial climate on campus, but Hispanics were more likely 
than white students to perceive such hostility”). This divergence is highlighted in a series of 
studies in which Black students were consistently more likely than any other racial group to 
“report lower levels of satisfaction with racial climates and perceive differential treatment on the 
basis of race.” Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 12. 
107. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 278 (“[M]icroaggressions (a) tend to be subtle, 
indirect, and unintentional, (b) are most likely to emerge not when a behavior would look 
prejudicial, but when other rationales can be offered for prejudicial behavior, and (c) occur when 
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looks, gestures, and tones” – perpetrators rarely recognize their harm.108 In 
conjunction with the earnest belief that people are not racist and the availability 
of  non-biased  justifications,109   perpetrators  are  often  able  to  explain  away 
actual racial bias.110 
Since perpetrators are often White, most have not experienced a litany of 
racial microaggressions throughout their own lives. As a result, even if 
perpetrators admit that an incident was racially motivated, they are likely to 
deemphasize its severity.111 This response, which communicates that People of 
Color are hypersensitive and should develop thicker skin, effectively denies the 
relevance and probative value of the victim’s viewpoint.112  By reallocating 
fault to the victim and delegitimizing the victim’s perspective, this behavior 
exacerbates the incident’s initial harm.113 
The subtle nature of racial microaggressions and the availability of 
alternative explanations poses a different problem for victims. Whereas 
perpetrators are able to dismiss race’s relevance, victims may struggle with 
questions regarding whether they actually are overreacting and reading too 
much into an innocent act.114 This identification challenge, which does not arise 
from easily identifiable and categorizable acts of invidious discrimination,115 





108.   Id. Environmental conditions unrelated to treatment can also produce racial 
microaggressions. For instance, though seemingly innocuous, a law school’s hallway display of 
White male judges can send messages about who does and does not belong in the legal profession. 
109.    For some White Americans, this self-trust exists alongside the belief that reverse 
discrimination against Whites has eclipsed racism against People of Color. See Michael I. Norton 
& Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game that they Are Now Losing, 6 
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 215 (2011); cf. Chang, supra note 96, at 1247 n.11 (1993) (describing a 
1991 poll that “revealed that the majority of American voters believe that Asian Americans are not 
discriminated against in the United States” and that “[s]ome even believe that Asian Americans 
receive ‘too many special advantages’”). 
110. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 275. One could also argue that claims of racism 
conflate racial bias with economic conservatism. To the extent such claims are warranted, it is 
equally important not to conflate principled conservativism, in which racial outcomes correlate to 
otherwise principled views, with modern racism, in which views are actually the product of racial 
bias. See Song Hing et al., A Two-Dimensional Model that Employs Explicit and Implicit Attitudes 
to Characterize Prejudice, 94 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 971 (2008). 
111. See Sue et al., supra note 9. 
112.    See, e.g., Yosso, supra note 77, at 671 (“All too often, as this Latina anticipated, 
when students spoke out against racial jokes, they found themselves on the defensive, responding 
to accusations of being “complainers,” “whiners,” “too sensitive,” and not able to ‘take a joke.’”). 
113. One  Black  female  undergrad  from  Berkeley  described  the  experience  of  self- 
silencing in the following terms: “There are times when I want to be angry, but I don’t want to fall 
into what they think every Black woman is and so a lot of times, I find myself restricted form 
saying what I feel or doing what I feel because I don’t want to perpetuate negative stereotypes.” 
Solórzano, supra note 9, at 42. 
114. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 278–79. 
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(3)  Stereotype Threat 
Stereotype  threat  is  another  harm  that  can  arise  from  environmental 
factors even in the absence of disparate treatment. This phenomenon refers to 
the “social-psychological threat that arises when one is in a situation or doing 
something  for  which  a  negative  stereotype  about  one’s  group  applies.”116 
Stereotype threat is distinct from student disengagement and the internalization 
of negative stereotypes. Rather, stereotype threat refers to the cognitive burden 
that arises when an individual attempts to perform a challenging task when 
failure would affirm a known negative stereotype about that individual’s group. 
This threat, which only depresses performance when an individual is pushed to 
the limit of her ability, most commonly affects the most talented within a 
group.117 
Due in part to stereotype threat, standardized tests and other common 
measures of intellect consistently under-measure the intellectual ability of 
individuals from racial groups that face negative stereotypes in academic 
settings.118  This undermeasurement accounts for a significant portion of the 
achievement gap that traditional explanations such as socioeconomic status or 
preparation cannot account for.119 
Since stereotype threat results from the “psychological context” in which 
students perform academic tasks, the prevalence of negative stereotypes 
alongside the severe underrepresentation of Latina/o and Black students in law 
school is likely sufficient to produce high threat conditions.120  As such, time- 
sensitive first-year examinations are likely to underestimate the talent of Black 
and Latina/o students.121 
Two seminal studies illustrate the effect and breadth of this phenomenon. 
In one study, researchers administered a set of GRE questions to Black and 
White Stanford University undergraduates.122  When researchers described the 
questions  as  diagnostic  of  intellectual  ability,  thus  priming  a  negative 
	  
	  
116.    Steele, A Threat in the Air, supra note 100, at 614. For a description of the cognitive 
mechanism driving stereotype threat, see Toni Schmader, Michael Johns & Chad Forbes, An 
Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects on Performance, 115 Psychol. Rev. 336 
(2008); Toni Schmader & Michael Johns, Converging Evidence that Stereotype Threat Reduces 
Working Memory Capacity, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 440 (2003). 
117. See STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 56–59. 
118.    See Walton et al., supra note 1. Stereotype threat has been identified as causing as 
much as a .25 standard deviation on some standardized tests for both women and Students of 
Color. See Walton & Spencer, supra note 1, at 1137. 
119. While most stereotype threat research has occurred in the laboratory setting, recent 
findings support the hypothesis that stereotype threat extends to real world contexts. See Walton et 
al., supra note 1, at 8–13 (discussing studies that support the assertion that stereotype threat 
affects real world performance). 
120. Id. 
121.    See Feingold, supra note 1, at 240 (discussing how first-year exams taken in high 
threat environments have the potential to mismeasure the ability of Students of Color). 
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stereotype about Blacks, Black participants performed significantly worse than 
their White counterparts.123 When the same questions were presented as a 
problem solving experiment, thus removing the relevance of stereotypes 
concerning  intellectual  ability,  participants  displayed  no  observable 
disparity.124 
In a later study, Asian American female students with high math ability 
took a series of difficult math questions.125 Prior to answering the questions, the 
students  filled  out  one  of  three  questionnaires  that  primed  their  gender 
identities,  primed  their  racial  identities  or  primed  no  identity.  The  initial 
priming enabled researchers to observe the interaction between performance 
and a negative stereotype (women and math) as well as performance and a 
positive stereotype (Asians and math).126 Priming a particular identity directly 
impacted performance. Students in the control group answered on average 49% 
of the questions correctly, students in the race-primed group answered 54% 
correctly, and students from the gender-primed group answered only 43% 
correctly.127 These findings illustrate the dynamic nature of stereotype threat; in 
addition to negative stereotypes depressing academic performance, positive 
stereotypes have the potential to boost performance. 
	  
II. RACIAL UNEVENNESS IN LAW SCHOOL 
	  
Having unpacked the dimensions of racial unevenness, in this Part we 
begin by explaining the high stakes of law school’s first-year exams. From 
here, we analyze the most common manifestations of racial unevenness in 
America’s top law schools. To be clear, we are not arguing that institutions 
should  accommodate  certain  students  who  cannot  handle  the  rigor  of  law 
school.128   There  is  great  value  in  a  professional  school  environment  that 
demands excellence from its students. For many students, regardless of race, 
law school presents an immensely trying and traumatic experience. Racial 
unevenness changes this baseline by injecting a layer of difference into an 
already highly competitive and challenging educational environment. These 
race-dependent burdens, which White students do not face, create obstacles 





123. Id. at 799-802. 
124.   Id. 
125.    Margaret  Shih,  Todd  L.  Pittinsky  &  Nalini  Ambady,  Stereotype  Susceptibility: 
Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80 (1999). 
126. Id. at 80–82 
127. Id. at 80. 
128.    Although racial unevenness has little do with the baseline difficulty of a particular 
task, it is most likely to produce disparate results on difficult tasks. Cf. Walton et al., supra note 1 
(explaining that stereotype threat is likely to impact performance only when an individual is 






2013] MEASURING THE RACIAL UNEVENNESS OF LAW SCHOOL 93 
	  
	  
There is nothing novel about the claim that race-dependent harms pervade 
law school. One prior articulation described law school as: 
a forked river, with one side offering a challenging and often dangerous 
white-water rapids course, the other side a swift but smooth current. . . 
All minority law students are made to ride the former, and they are often 
joined by older law students, law students with physical or learning 
disabilities,   and   law   students   from   disadvantaged   socioeconomic 
origins.129 
	  
A.   The Stakes - Pathways and Prerequisites 
	  
In many educational environments, students receive a variety of feedback 
and evaluation throughout the life of a particular course. Feedback commonly 
comes in the form of shorter assignments, quizzes or midterm examinations. By 
contrast, most American law schools provide no student evaluation outside of a 
single, final exam. This format is common in most first-year courses, which are 
pre-assigned  to  students  and  involve  subject  matter  that  is  nearly  uniform 
across accredited law schools. As a consequence, a student’s first year GPA 
usually is based solely on two or three sets of final exams, depending on 
whether the school operates on a semester or quarter schedule. Furthermore, a 
strict grading curve – especially in the first year – limits the number of As and 
Bs  a  professor  can  give.130   Since  GPA  is  often  the  first  thing  a  potential 
employer looks at, perhaps in conjunction with the student’s law school, final 
exams heavily determine a student’s initial career opportunities. 
Beginning with a student’s first semester, and especially following the 
first year, final exam grades place students on a particular track. A student’s 
track determines the ease with she is able to “win” at law school. For purposes 
of this Article, we define “win” as the ability to access law school’s most 
coveted resources and rewards. These resources and rewards become 
immediately self-perpetuating; early resources and rewards are prerequisites for 
the later, more coveted prizes. Failing to win early-on does not eliminate a 
student’s ability to access a later prize, but early victories make later prizes 
significantly easier to obtain. A student’s early success thus largely determines 
their law school destiny. 
The most coveted prizes include (more or less in chronological order): 




129. Clydesdale, supra note 11, at 712. 
130. See BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 96 (2012). 
131.   See, e.g., Solórzano, supra note 9, at 66–67 (discussing the prevalence of low 
expectations even in the face of contradictory evidence and students’ frustration in attempting to 
find study group partners at the undergraduate level); Hunt, supra note 30. Study groups, similar 
to the subsequent prizes, are a highly valued and sought-after law school commodity. Many 
students believe academic success in law school depends in part on the ability to gain entry into a 
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on law review; second-summer job at an elite, high-paying, large law firm; a 
clerkship for a federal (appellate) judge; a prestigious fellowship; an associate 
position at that same elite, high-paying, large law firm; and potentially a future 
position as law faculty. Each prize is either a means or an end to the ultimate 
goals of money and power.132 
The significance of first-semester and first-year grades cannot be 
understated. The traditional second summer of law school is spent at a large 
law firm. Most interviewing and hiring for these positions occurs during the fall 
of the second year. Thus, employers are looking primarily at students’ first-year 
GPAs.  The  majority of  large  firms  (and  other  employers)  uses  GPA  as  a 
guidepost,  if  not  a  threshold.133   First-year  grades  are  the  gatekeepers  that 
determine which students can get in the door. 
In addition to grades, many employers highly value student membership 
on an institution’s flagship law journal.134 This view arises in part from the 
common perception that membership on such journals signals something about 
a student’s ability and talent. However, access to the most coveted journals is 
often related to a student’s first year grades. Even when first-year grades are 
not determinative for all students,135  there is often a correlation between first 
year  grades  and  journal  membership.  Membership  on  a  school’s  flagship 
journal provides access to power and opportunity within and outside of law 
school. Much of this power originates from the prestige associated with journal 
membership. Internal power derives from the special privileges, access to 
resources, and physical space that journal membership entails. Externally, 
journals provide access to exclusive alumni networks and coveted career 
opportunities. 
Beyond access to competitive law firms, journal membership acts as a 
direct conduit, and in many cases a necessary prerequisite, to federal clerkships. 




negotiation that goes  into the formation of  study  groups  have the  potential to communicate 
underlying assumptions about who is, and who is not, likely to finish at the top of the class 
132.    We recognize that many individuals enter law school without the goal of gaining 
high earning power. Many students enter premier law schools specifically intending to enter the 
public sector or engage in public interest work. As such, the above formula is underinclusive in 
terms of students’ entering interests and desires as well as some of the prizes sought. However, 
although personal, ideological and political commitments will vary, the ability to realize one’s 
goals is directly related to one’s individual power, which arises in large part from a law school 
resume. Regardless of the sphere one wishes to enter, GPA plays a determinative role in providing 
access and opening doors. 
133. Some law firms use a GPA floor, below which they will rarely consider an applicant. 
134.    Legal scholarship is published through student-run law journals. Although most law 
schools have a variety of journals, the institution’s flagship journal (often referred to as the “Law 
Review”) is by far the most prestigious. Student membership on secondary journals carries far less 
weight. 
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perhaps  the  most  competitive.  The  prestige  of  a  federal  appellate  court 
clerkship  is  difficult  to  match  in  the  legal  community.  Such  clerkships, 
especially at the appellate level, often provide unmatched experience alongside 
access to more coveted prizes and positions. In the same way that membership 
on a journal sets an otherwise identical resume apart, an appellate clerkship has 
rather unparalleled signaling power. And again, it likely all began with a 
student’s first-year grades. 
Beyond signaling talent or merit to future employers, first-semester and 
first-year grades indicate to students whether law school was the proper choice, 
the proper fit, and whether “I belong here.” In an environment that is often 
competitive and disorienting, early failure can erode students’ confidence and 
sense of self. Compounded by racial unevenness, Students of Color who 
experience academic disappointment may be particularly vulnerable to 
disassociate from law school. In the aggregate, disassociation and related 
underperformance may reproduce stereotypes about who does and does not 
belong in a particular institution. 
	  
B.   The Harm - A Temporal Framing 
	  
Assuming that racial unevenness is present during the first semester of 
law school, Students of Color confront unique hurdles, and therefore must do 
more to achieve the same result, than their White colleagues. With respect to 
unevenness generally, the situation resembles that involving Anne and Dan 
from our opening hypothetical. To understand the most common manifestations 
of racial unevenness in law school, we employ the following temporal 
framework: (1) the final exam, (2) before the final exam, and (3) after the final 
exam. 
	  
1. The Final Exam 
As  described  above,  first-semester  and  first-year  grades  significantly 
impact a student’s law school destiny. Since evaluation is limited to the final 
exam,  first-semester  grades  mark  one  of  the  first  moments  where  the 
measurable consequences of racial unevenness are likely to appear.136 
In addition to race-dependent burdens that manifest prior to a final exam, 
stereotype threat is likely to burden Black and Latino students during the exam 
itself.   As described above, stereotype threat detrimentally impacts an 








136. Disparate attrition rates may provide another means of measuring racial unevenness 
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negative stereotype about her group applies.137  Law school final exams often 
present the factors necessary to produce this psychological threat. 
In relevant ways, law school exams are similar to tests such as the SAT 
and MCAT, in which the effects of stereotype threat have been documented.138 
First,  law school finals  are  widely understood  as  evaluative  of  intellectual 
ability. Second, negative stereotypes about the intellectual abilities of Black 
and Latino students remain prevalent on law school campuses; students may 
perceive  that  poor  performance  on  an  exam  would  confirm  the  negative 
stereotype.139 Third, law school exams often involve novel and complex legal 
problems and present students with incredible time constraints that resemble 
the speeded nature of the SAT and LSAT. The impact of these factors, likely 
sufficient to trigger stereotype threat, can become exacerbated in classrooms 
with only a token number of Students of Color.140 Black and Latina/o students 
who find themselves in such classrooms are therefore most prone to confront 
stereotype threat and the racial harms it produces. 
	  
2. Before the Final Exam 
The presence of racial unevenness prior the exam can exert its own, 
significant harm, which Students of Color must overcome to enter the final 
exam on equal footing with their White counterparts. This pre-exam racial 
unevenness is symbolized by the two metaphorical rivers referenced above; 
Students of Color must contend with white-water rapids while White students 
enjoy a gentle current. 
These  rivers  remain  divergent  in  part  due  to  the  pervasive  use  of 
traditional legal pedagogy, known as the case method, in first-year law school 
classrooms. The case method, which has dominated American law schools 
since Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced it to Harvard Law School in 
the 1870’s, requires students to divine abstract legal principles from appellate 
decisions.141 Langdell developed the case method in response to critiques that 




137.    Steele, A Threat in the Air, supra note 100, at 614. For a description of the cognitive 
mechanism driving stereotype threat, see Schmader, An Integrated Process, supra note 116; 
Schmader, Converging Evidence, supra note 116. 
138. See id. at 13–15 (estimating the stereotype threat effect on the SAT). 
139.    See, e.g., Sander, supra note 78 (arguing that Black and Latino students who gain 
admission to law school through race-conscious admissions policies are at a disadvantage because 
they  are  academically  inferior  to  their  counterparts  who  were  not  admitted  through  such 
programs); Kendra Fox-Davis, A Badge of Inferiority: One Law Student’s Story of a Racially 
Hostile Educational Environment, 23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 98 (2010) (describing the impact that 
Sander’s mismatch theory had on the author’s law school experience). 
140. Id. 
141. Chang, supra note 96. 
142. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
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case  method,  which  attempts  to  frame  law as  a  “scientific”  endeavor,  has 
shrouded legal analysis under the veil of racial-neutrality ever since. 
Although few would still argue that legal analysis actually occurs in a 
perspectiveless vacuum, the presentation of legal doctrine continues to rely on 
the assumption that the law has evolved, and continues to function, through 
race-neutral legal principles. These principles, which students uncover in 
appellate  opinions,  are  presented  as  natural  conclusions,  unrelated  to  the 
implicit and explicit racial biases and perspectives of the judges who developed 
the law. However, since the judiciary has remained predominately White and 
male, legal principles have been shaped by a particular racial (and gendered) 
lens.143 This reality runs in tension with the articulation of legal analysis as an 
objective endeavor in which one’s race is irrelevant to outcome.144 
Presenting legal analysis as a race-neutral endeavor produces racial 
unevenness in the following way: allegedly race-neutral legal principles dictate 
what facts are relevant, sufficient or necessary to solve a particular legal 
problem. Due largely to the legacy of a White (i.e. race-normed) judiciary, facts 
about race and social context have been overwhelmingly marginalized to the 
category of irrelevant evidence. “Objective” legal analysis provides little space 
for the invocation of race. 
One of a law student’s first challenges consists of learning how to 
distinguish relevant and irrelevant facts. This task can pose heightened 
challenges for students who understand the world and their lived experience 
through a racially salient lens.145  Since traditional legal pedagogy has largely 
exorcised race from “objective” legal analysis, students who attempt to inject 
race  into  classroom  conversations  risk  reprimand  for  adopting  an 
inappropriately “perspectived” approach. At a minimum, professors often 





143. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990). 
144.    See Chang, supra note 96 (“When the legal academy was made up exclusively of 
white males, a legal scholar did not have to reveal the context from which he spoke because 
everyone occupied the same context. This shared context fostered a false sense of acontextuality, 
where one could pretend to be aperspectival because only one perspective was represented. With 
the entry of women and persons of color into the legal academy and with their use of personal 
narratives in scholarship, whether perspective matters has become a contested issue.”). This notion 
of objectivity fails to recognize that “just as science has learned that the perspective of the 
observer can not only affect, but can also determine, what is observed, law must also recognize the 
importance of perspective.” Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional 
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1989) 
(“Difficult as it is to view the world from someone else’s perspective, not to make the effort is to 
ignore what science learned long ago.”). 
145. See generally Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (discussing the “bifurcated 
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gone through the same training, many professors struggle to meaningfully 
engage race even if they desire to do so. 
Students entering law school with an interpretive lens that foregrounds 
race (or another axis of identity) face various choices.146 They may engage in 
“bifurcated thinking” by suppressing the worldview they have always known in 
favor of a particular viewpoint deemed to be race-neutral and perspectiveless. 
Even  though  many  students  are  able  to  perform  this  task,  the  coerced 
suppression of a race-conscious perspective is not without consequence.147 This 
self-censoring privileges a particular perspective and may cause students to feel 
silenced or to have “compromised” their true identity.148 Alternatively, those 
students unable or unwilling to discard a race-conscious lens are left vulnerable 
and exposed for abandoning a “race-neutral” viewpoint.149  Although it may 
seem minor, this is another channel through which racial unevenness permeates 
law school. 
Exacerbating   the   effect   of   traditional   legal   pedagogy   are   certain 
interpretive legal frameworks, such as Colorblindness, that expressly reject 
race’s relevance to legal analysis. Taken to the extreme, proponents of 
Colorblindness claim that the Constitution forbids the government from ever 
taking race into account.150  This view is rooted in a formal conception of 
race;151 race is nothing more than skin color, unrelated to disparate outcomes or 




146.    This unevenness need not occur strictly along racial lines. Not all Students of Color 
will have experienced race as a salient component of their identity. Nor will all White students 
have lived a life free from racial consciousness. Thus, this particular form of unevenness arising 
from legal pedagogy is arguably race-neutral. However, since Students of Color are more likely to 
bring a race-conscious perspective to class, they are more likely to suffer this burden. 
147.    As Chang states, “[i]n this way, rules of evidence silence us. In order to get our 
stories into evidence, we need to broaden or change the very meaning of evidence.” Chang, supra 
note 96, at 172. 
148. Id.; see also Carbado, Working Identity, supra note 28. 
149.    Matsuda, supra note 145, at 8–9 (“A professor once remarked that the mediocre law 
students are the ones who are still trying to make it all make sense. That is, the students who are 
trying to understand the law as necessary, logical and co-extensive with reality. The students who 
excel in law schools – and the best lawyers – are the ones who are able to detach law and to see it 
as a system that makes sense only from a particular viewpoint.”). 
150.    Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson has become the common citation to 
support this claim. See 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all 
citizens are equal before the law.”).  In citing Harlan’s dissent as the ideological foundation of 
Colorblindness, scholars too often fail to recognize that Harlan’s reasoning and conclusions were 
based in part on his openly racist views about the Chinese. See id. (“There is a race so different 
from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United 
States. . . . I allude to the Chinese race.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice 
Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996) (critiquing traditional narratives of 
Harlan’s Plessy dissent). 
151. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 
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such as “I don’t see color” and “We are all human beings.” Regardless of the 
underlying intent, these statements can create harm by denying the reality of 
historical and contemporary modes of racial oppression and discrimination.152 
And by denying the existence of racial oppression as common to modern life, 
colorblindness excuses all but the most egregious and overt behavior as free 
from prejudice. 
Conversations  about  affirmative  action,  common  to  first-year 
Constitutional Law classes, further illustrate the reciprocally reinforcing nature 
of Colorblindness and racial unevenness. This occurs both at the abstract level, 
when students refer to affirmative action as a “preference,” and at the more 
concrete level, when students wonder out loud whether their classmates were 
admitted  because  of  affirmative  action.153      Both  statements  are  damaging 
because they send a broader message about the qualifications of an individual 
and their racial group.154 The presumption that certain bodies do not belong, 
which underlies such claims, communicates that Students of Color lack merit 
and objective qualifications.155 
Even if comments are subtle and not always the product of racial bias, 
constantly confronting messages that you (or your race) do not belong can 
create serious psychological and emotional harm. Solórzano reports that in 
addition to “self-doubt and frustration,” Black students “feel academically and 
socially alienated in spaces where such oppression occurs.”156  This harm has 
been  characterized  as  “racial  battle  fatigue”157    and  “Mundane  Extreme 




152.    Sue et al., supra note 9, at 274; see also JANET HELMS, A RACE IS A NICE THING TO 
HAVE: A GUIDE TO BEING A WHITE PERSON OR UNDERSTANDING THE WHITE PERSONS IN YOUR 
LIFE (1992). 
153.    Id. (“During a conversation about hiring or admissions, ‘I believe the most qualified 
person should get the job regardless of race,’ or when an employee or student of color is asked 
‘How did you get your job.’ The underlying message is twofold: (a) People of color are not 
qualified, and (b) as a person of color, you must have obtained the position through affirmative 
action.”). 
154. See Pinel, supra note 102, at 484; see also Deidre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An 
Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197 (2010); 
Solórzano, supra note 9, at 67 (“[S]everal students indicated that key among the most negative 
racial assumptions Whites on their campuses held about them had to do with how African 
American students entered the university. . . .”). 
155. Perhaps surprising to those who believe affirmative action stigmatizes Students of 
Color, such perceptions by Whites are most pronounced in states that have banned race-based 
affirmative action programs. See Bowen, supra note 154. 
156. Solórzano, supra note 9, at 69. 
157.    Yosso,  supra  note  77,  at  661  (“Symptoms  associated  with  racial  battle  fatigue 
include:  suppressed  immunity  and  increased  sickness,  tension  headaches,  trembling  and 
jumpiness, chronic pain in healed injuries, elevated blood pressure, constant anxiety, ulcers, 
increased  swearing  or  complaining,  insomnia  or  sleep  broken  by  haunting  conflict-specific 
dreams, rapid mood swings, difficulty thinking or speaking coherently, and emotional and social 
withdrawal. In anticipation of a racial conflict, reported symptoms include a pounding heartbeat, 
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mundane, because this stress is part of our day-to-day experience and is 
so common that we almost take it for granted; extreme, because it has an 
extreme impact on our psyche and world view, how we see ourselves, 
behave,  and  interact;  environmental,  because  it  is  environmentally 
located,  induced  and  fostered;  stress,  because  the  ultimate  impact  is 
indeed stressful, detracting and energy-consuming.158 
Applied to the law school setting, such harms can exact an emotional and 
psychological cumulative toll on Students of Color. This is a burden their 
White counterparts never need to confront and often fail to see. We again see 
our  two  rivers,  with  disparately  challenging  currents  that  students  must 
navigate on a daily basis. 
	  
3. After the Final Exam 
Racial unevenness can arise after the final exam due to the way that 
institutions discuss and understand the existence of racial achievement gaps. As 
in  other  domains,  law  schools  can  too  readily  frame  disparities  as  a 
consequence of “deficient” students.159 Under this typical framing, the 
achievement gap is the result of students’ inherent inferiority160 or inadequate 
preparation.161 By placing the fault for relative underperformance on students, 
this  framing  reinforces  the  underlying  tropes  about  Black  and  Latina/o 
students’ intellectual abilities. Diagnosing the problem as deficient students 
also presumes that it is the students, as opposed to the institutions, that need 
“fixing.”  This framing proceeds from the following formula: If two similarly 
situated students162  of different races enter law school with the same talent, 
they will have the same chance of success. 
For institutions where racial unevenness is present, this formula is ill- 
founded. With evidence that race, independent of talent, preparation, work ethic 
or desire,163 shapes opportunities for success in law school, we must critically 
	  
	  
158.     Solórzano, supra note 9, at 17; see also Sue et al., supra note 9 (arguing that 
“microaggressions are detrimental to persons of color because they impair performance in a 
multitude of settings by sapping the psychic and spiritual energy of recipients by creating 
inequities”). 
159. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti- 
Affirmative Action Laws, 157 PENN. L. REV. 1075, 1109–13 (2009). 
160. See, e.g., HERRNSTEIN, supra note 78; ARTHUR JENSEN, EDUCABILITY AND GROUP 
DIFFERENCE (1973). 
161. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 402–03 (1997). 
162.   Similarly situated would mean, for instance, that the two students align along 
traditional demographic dimensions (such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, etc.) as well as 
academic preparation and desire. The point is to imagine two students who are identical except for 
their race. 
163. See, e.g., Clydesdale, supra note 11, at 737, 752 n.34 (observing disparate racial 
outcomes even when holding constant “LSAT scores, undergraduate GPAs, hours of planned 
study, hours of planned employment, various additional distractions, self-confidence, and even 
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reexamine the role of our legal institutions in facilitating racial achievement 
gaps. As a first step, we must amend the dominant narrative of “deficient” 
students and instead focus on rectifying “deficient” institutions. 
	  
III. MEASURING RACIAL UNEVENNESS AT UCLA LAW – THE DAC 
SURVEY ON DIVERSITY AND CLASSROOM CLIMATE 
	  
Even for those readers who accept that racial unevenness exists in the 
abstract, many may remain skeptical that racial unevenness exists at an 
institution such as UCLA Law. Part of this skepticism may stem from the 
unease many readers feel with the words “racist” and “racism,”164 which likely 
come to mind when reading a report on racial unevenness and racially hostile 
environments.165 To avoid equivocation, our use of the terms racial unevenness 
or racially hostile to describe UCLA Law does not signify that we observed a 
conscious intent to create an unwelcoming environment for Students of Color. 
Although particular instances likely arise, the majority of the racial unevenness 
we observed does not appear to have been the result of intentional 
discrimination. Rather, our findings illustrate that the racially hostile 
environment that disproportionately burdens Students of Color exists 
notwithstanding UCLA Law’s best intentions. 
Perhaps due in part to students’ inability to provide sufficient “evidence of 
racism,” or choice not to make such allegations, UCLA Law has been slow to 
recognize student claims that a problem of racial unevenness exists in the Law 
School. For the UCLA Law students who have felt this unevenness, it has been 
their burden to prove that racial unevenness does exist. The DAC Survey is the 
most recent iteration of this effort. In the remainder of this Article, we detail the 
methodology and results of the DAC Survey. 
	  
	  
White Test Score Gap in the First Two Years of School, 86 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 447 (2004) 
(“Even after controlling for a wide range of covariates including family structure, socioeconomic 
status, measures of school quality, and neighborhood characteristics, a substantial racial gap in test 
scores persists.”); Claude M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, 269 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 68 (1992) (arguing that standard explanations are incomplete, as low SAT scorers are 
not more likely to flunk out than high SAT scorers; achievement gaps exist even when Blacks do 
not suffer financial disadvantage; and controlling for any level of previous school preparation, 
Blacks achieve less in subsequent schooling than Whites). 
164.    As recent events remind us, few accusations are more damaging in our society than 
that of being a racist. See Feingold & Lorang, supra note 67 (discussing the national debate 
regarding whether or not George Zimmerman, the individual who shot Trayvon Martin, was 
racist). Recently, a federal judge denied the possibility that he was racist while simultaneously 
admitting the racist attitudes underlying a private email he sent to friends. See JOHN S. ADAMS, 
GREAT  FALLS  TRIBUNE,  Federal  judge  forwards  racially  charged  email  (March  1,  2012), 
available at, http://www.greatfallstribune.com/article/20120229/NEWS01/120229014/Chief-U-S- 
District-Judge-sends-racially-charged-email-about-president; See also, Kang, Are Ideal Litigators 
White?, supra note 27  (asserting that “few terms generate greater anxiety, concern, resentment, 
and passion in U.S. society” than “racist” or “racism”). 
165. For  others,  the  terms  “racist”  and  “racism”  may  be  welcomed  as  the  most 
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We first provide a brief historical review of UCLA Law’s racial 
demographics. This summary is meant to highlight that Students of Color, 
especially Black and Latina/o students, were not always underrepresented at 
UCLA  Law.166   In  1994,  Black  and  Latina/o  students  comprised  over  100 
students in the first-year class.167 The adoption of Proposition 209 and the 
subsequent voluntary eradication of race-based admissions at UCLA Law 
triggered a dramatic shift in Law School’s racial composition. By 1999, the 
entering  class  of  289  students  included  3  Black  and  18  Latina/o  students 
only.168 Over the subsequent twelve years, the numbers slightly improved. 
Despite efforts to recruit more Students of Color, out of 319 students, the 2011 
entering class included 11 Black students and 25 Latina/o students.169 
	  
	  
A.   Method 
	  
1. The Instrument. 
The DAC Survey is a student-opinion survey that contained thirty discrete 
items.170 Items fell into one of five categories: 
1) Perception Items. The majority of survey items measured student 
perceptions of racial diversity and campus racial climate at UCLA Law. A 
minority of perception items dealt with gender and sexual orientation. Items in 
this group required students to make a descriptive claim that went beyond his 
or her individual experience. This differed from description items, which only 
inquired into a student’s personal experience. 
2) Description Items. As noted above, description items asked students 
about their own experience only. Inquiries about personal experience could be 
categorized as a form of perception. However, because there is an arguable 
difference between a student’s perception about general climate and about his 
or her personal experience, we present these items as distinct. 
3)  Normative  Items.  Two  items  required  students  to  make  normative 
claims. Unlike perception and description items that required students to state 
how UCLA Law is, these items required students to state how they believe 
UCLA Law should be. 
4) Demographic Items. The survey concluded with three demographic 
items concerning gender, sexual orientation, and race/ethnicity. For access to 
	  
	  
166.    Any claim of underrepresentation requires a comparator to measure representation. 
For  UCLA  Law,  the  racial  demographics  of  Los  Angeles  or  California  are  both  arguably 
reasonable comparators. However, even using national statistics, Black and Latina/o students are 
proportionally underrepresented at UCLA Law. 
167. Cheryl Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1215, 1237 
(2002). 
168. Id. at 1236. 
169. Statistics provided by the UCLA Law Office of Admissions. 
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more  nuanced  data,  students  may  want  to  consider  including  demographic 
items about socioeconomic status and class year in subsequent administrations 
of the DAC Survey. 
5) Qualitative Item. The final survey item invited students to include any 
additional comments. This item was left open-ended so that students could 
write freely without any restriction. 
	  
2.  Participants and Procedure 
Eligible  participants  included  currently  enrolled  UCLA  Law  students. 
Non-JD students and students who transferred into UCLA Law after their first 
year of law school were excluded. This decision was made based on the belief 
that the first year of law school is most determinative in shaping a student’s 
perception of classroom climate. 
The DAC Survey was administered to 300 randomly selected students 
from the eligible participant pool. To create this random sample, survey 
administrators assigned a unique number (1-1,003) to every first, second, and 
third-year UCLA Law student. This randomly assigned number corresponded 
to each student’s photograph in the UCLA Law photo book. After assigning 
numbers, administrators utilized an Excel random number generator to create 
an indefinite list of numbers. The list was followed sequentially and students 
were selected from the eligible participant pool if their number appeared in the 
list. Administrators followed this process until 300 different students had been 
selected. 
The DAC Survey was created and administered as a Google Form. Google 
Forms are electronically created surveys that may be administered over the 
Internet. The survey’s administration consisted of a series of three emails that 
solicited survey participation from the universe of 300 selected participants. 
178 students, or 59% of the 300 selected participants, completed the survey. 
	  
	  
B.   Results 
	  
The following section provides a summary of relevant findings. The 
majority  of  survey  items  presented  students  with  a  statement,  and  then 
instructed students to indicate their agreement or disagreement. Common 
response choices included: strongly agree; somewhat agree; neither; somewhat 
disagree; strongly disagree; no response. Unless otherwise indicated, this 
analysis chunks somewhat agree with strongly agree responses and somewhat 
disagree with strongly disagree responses. As such, the reported findings do not 
distinguish between respondents who marked strongly agree and somewhat 
agree. Both responses are treated as agree. 
In order to compare responses across demographic categories, 
administrators cross-tabbed responses by race and gender. Race cross-tabs were 
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race  by  looking  to  the   respondent’s  self-identified  race  on  the  racial 
demographic survey item. Five respondents did not select any race and were 
excluded from race cross tabs. Using the racial identifiers, administrators first 
divided students into two categories: White students and Students of Color. 
Since the racial demographic item allowed students to select more than one 
race, a number of respondents identified as multiple races. For students who 
marked multiple races, one of which was White, administrators had to choose 
whether to include students in the White or Students of Color category. For 
purposes of this Article, all students who selected White have been placed in 
the White category. Some will question this decision as running counter to the 
historical rule of hypodescent, in which whiteness is an exclusive category 
marked  by  absolute  purity.  Recognizing  this  critique,  administrators 
recalculated many of the responses using an alternative grouping, wherein all 
students  who  marked  two  races  were  grouped  in  the  Students  of  Color 
category.  Changing  the  grouping  did  not  alter  results  to  a  statistically 
significant degree. 
	  
1. Normative Survey Items 
Normative survey items produced near unanimous responses. Students 
overwhelmingly supported student body racial diversity. Eighty-nine percent of 
students (N = 178)171  agreed with the statement, “UCLA Law should have a 
racially diversity student body.” Only 4% of students affirmatively disagreed 
with this statement. An even greater majority of students reported that the 
administration has an ethical responsibility to respond to incidents that make 
students feel disrespected or unwelcome because of their race. Specifically, 
92% of students agreed with the statement, “The UCLA Law administration 
has an ethical responsibility to respond to these types of incidents when they 
are made aware of them.” In this survey item, “these types of incidents” refers 
to a series of preceding survey items that asked students to state whether the 
behavior of another student, professor or administrator had caused them to feel 
“unwelcome or disrespected because of my race.” 
	  
2. Perception Survey Items – Campus Racial Climate 
Survey items concerning campus racial climate and racial and gender 
unevenness revealed significant divergence along racial and gender lines. 
Women  and  Students  of  Color  were  far  more  likely than  men  and  White 
students to perceive UCLA Law as a racially and gender-hostile environment. 
Seventy-four percent of White students (N = 106) described UCLA Law’s 
classroom environment as always or mostly welcoming to students regardless 
of race. Only 24% of White students described the classroom environment as 
	  
	  
171. N refers to the number of students in a particular category who responded to the 
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sometimes or never welcoming to students regardless of race. In contrast, 49% 
of Students of Color (N = 67) described the classroom environment as always 
or mostly welcoming regardless of race. An equal 49% of Students of Color 
responded that the environment is sometimes or never welcoming to students 
regardless of race. 
Women and Students of Color were also more likely than their male and 
White colleagues to perceive racial unevenness at UCLA Law. Seventy-six 
percent of Students of Color (N = 67) agreed that “Non-White students face 
challenges at UCLA Law that similarly situated White students do not face” 
(see table 1). Only 16% of Students of Color disagreed with this statement. In 
contrast, 42% of White students (N = 106) agreed with the statement, and 32% 
disagreed.  Moreover,  responses  cross-tabbed  by  gender  revealed  a  similar 
distribution. Among women (N = 78), 63% agreed with the statement, while 






Students’  perceptions  regarding  the  engagement  of  race  in  first-year 
courses revealed a similar racial and gender divergence. Among Students of 
Color (N = 67) and women (N = 78), only 21% of respondents agreed that 
professors who teach first year students actively recognize and promote open 
discussions about race in first-year courses. Sixty six percent of Students of 
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106) and 45% of men (N = 98) agreed with the statement. Forty percent of 
White students and men disagreed. 
Women and Students of Color were more likely than their male and White 
counterparts to perceive gender unevenness at UCLA Law. Sixty-three percent 
of women (N= 78) agreed that “Female students face challenges at UCLA Law 
that  similarly  situated  male  students  do  not  face.”  Only  22%  of  women 
disagreed with this statement. In contrast, 36% of men (N = 98) agreed with the 
statement.   Forty   five   percent   of   men   disagreed.   Moreover,   responses 
correlating with race closely tracked correlations with gender. Among Students 
of Color (N = 67), 64% agreed with the statement and only 22% disagreed. 
Among White students (N = 106), 39% agreed with the statement and 42% 
disagreed. 
Women and Students of Color were more likely than their male and White 
counterparts to perceive sexual-orientation unevenness at UCLA Law. Forty- 
six percent of women (N= 78) agreed that “LGBT students face challenges at 
UCLA Law that similarly situated straight students do not face.” Only 17% of 
women disagreed with this statement. In contrast, 28% of men (N = 98) agreed 
with the statement. Forty-four percent disagreed. Again, correlations with race 
closely tracked correlations with gender. Among Students of Color (N = 67), 
40%  agreed  with  the  statement,  while  only 22%  disagreed.  Among  White 
students (N = 106), 34% agreed with the statement, while 37% disagreed. 
	  
3. Perception Survey Items - Student and Faculty Diversity 
A student’s race impacts the way in which that student perceives racial 
diversity in the law school. Among Students of Color (N = 67), only 28% 
agreed with the statement, “UCLA Law has a racially diverse student body.” 
Forty-one percent of Students of Color disagreed with the same statement. In a 
near opposite split, 43% of White students (N = 106) agreed that “UCLA Law 
has a racially diverse student body,” while 27% of White students disagreed 
with this statement. 
Cross-tabbing by race also revealed students’ divergent perceptions about 
faculty racial diversity. Only 22% of Students of Color (N = 67) agreed with 
the statement, “UCLA Law has a racially diverse faculty.” Fifty-eight percent 
of Students of Color disagreed with this statement. In contrast, White students 
(N = 106) were evenly split, with 35% selecting, “UCLA Law has a racially 
diverse faculty,” and 35% selecting, “UCLA Law does not have a racially 
diverse faculty.” 
Interestingly,  even  though  responses  revealed  divergent  student 
perceptions about the Law School’s racial composition, Students of Color and 
White students revealed similar perceptions about the administration’s 
commitment to racial diversity in the law school. A slight majority of Students 
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racially diverse student body is a priority of the administration. One notable 
divergence is that 36% of Students of Color disagreed with this statement, in 
comparison to only 18% of White students. 
Students’  perceptions  regarding  the  administration’s  commitment  to 
faculty racial diversity tracked this convergence. Both Students of Color and 
White students expressed a lack of faith in the administration’s commitment to 
a racially diverse faculty. Only 31% of Students of Color (N = 67) and just over 
40% of White students (N = 106) agreed that “a racially diverse faculty is a 
high priority of the UCLA Law administration.” Again, Students of Color were 
far  more  likely  than  White  students  to  affirmatively  disagree  with  this 
statement. In comparison to 24% of White students, 49% of Students of Color 
disagreed with the statement that “faculty racial diversity is a high priority of 
the UCLA Law administration.” 
	  
4. Description Survey Items 
	  
To determine whether students felt their race was relevant at UCLA Law, 
the DAC Survey asked students to agree or disagree with the following 
statement: “When I am at law school, my racial identity is unimportant. I am 
just another student.” Responses revealed that a student’s race significantly 
impacts the likelihood that the student is consciously aware of her race and 
views her racial identity as relevant at UCLA Law (see Table 2). Students of 
Color and White students responded with diametrically opposed views. Only 
24% of Students of Color (N = 67) agreed with the statement, while 64% of 
Students of Color disagreed. In a near flip, 59% of White students (N = 106) 
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Among Students of Color, responses to this survey item revealed 
divergences among Asian American, Latina/o and Black students.172 As the 
aggregate responses suggest, Asian American, Latina/o and Black students 
disagreed with the statement in Table 2 at a rate far greater than White students. 
However, the results from this sample reveal noteworthy divergence (at least 
among the individual respondents) among the three racial groups. At 62%, 
Asian American respondents (N = 21) were least likely to disagree with the 
statement  that  their  racial  identity  was  unimportant  while  at  law  school. 
Seventy-seven percent of Latina/o respondents (N = 13) disagreed with the 
statement. Ninety-percent of Black respondents (N = 10) disagreed. 
The DAC Survey also included a series of questions that inquired into 
whether another student’s, faculty member’s, or administrator’s behavior made 
respondents feel unwelcome or disrespected because of their race. Responses 
indicated that, depending on the perpetrator of the incident (student, faculty, 
member or administrator), Students of Color were between 3 to 8 times more 
likely than White students to experience an incident that made them feel 
unwelcome or disrespected because of their race. 
Twenty-five percent of all respondents (N = 178) reported experiencing an 
incident in which another student’s behavior made them feel unwelcome or 
disrespected because of their race. Forty-three percent of Students of Color (N 
= 67) reported such an incident, in comparison to only 13% of White students 
(N = 106) (ratio of 3.31:1). Disaggregating by race revealed that 38% of Asian 
American students (N = 21) experienced such an incident. While more common 
than White students’ experiences, Asian American students were less likely to 
experience such an incident than Latina/o (62%, N = 13) and Black (60%, N = 
10) students. 
Additionally, seventeen percent of all respondents (N = 178) reported 
feeling unwelcome or disrespected as a result of a faculty member’s behavior. 
Cross-tabbing by race revealed that 33% of Students of Color reported 
experiencing such an incident, and only 8% of White students reported such an 
incident (ratio of 4.13:1) (see Table 3). Disaggregating Students of Color into 
individual racial groups revealed that 30% of Asian American students (N = 
27) experienced such an incident. Though more common than White students’ 
experiences, Asian American students were less likely to experience such an 







172.    Due to the small sample size, there may be a legitimate concern about generalizing 
these findings across all Asian American students, Latino/a students, and Black students at the law 
school. Although we recognize this concern, the data is meaningful regardless of generalizability 
and thus worth including in this report. Additionally, these disaggregations are included in order 










With  respect  to  administrators,  only  10%  of  students  reported 
experiencing such an incident. Notwithstanding this relatively lower rate, the 
ratio between Students of Color and White students increased. While 22% of 
Students of Color reported such an incident, only 3% of White students 
experienced feeling unwelcome or disrespected as a result of an administrator’s 
behavior (ratio 7.33:1). Disaggregating by race revealed that 19% of Asian 
American students (N = 27) experienced such an incident. Though more 
common than White students’ experiences, Asian American students were less 
likely to experience such an incident than Latina/o (23%, N = 13) and Black 
(36%, N = 11) students. 
Beyond  gross  and  relative  differences  in  students’  experiences  with 
racially hostile incidents, survey responses revealed that these incidents had a 
more severe impact on Students of Color. Among students who experienced 
one of the aforementioned incidents, Students of Color (N = 32) thought about 
the event longer than White students (N = 15). Sixty-three percent of Students 
of Color reported thinking about the incident(s) for multiple days and 31% 
reported thinking about the incident(s) for a month or more. In contrast, 53% of 
White students thought about the incident for one day or less. And, 33% of 
White students reported thinking about the incident for multiple days, while 
only 8% reported thinking about the event for a month or more. 
To further analyze the impact of such incidents, the DAC Survey utilized 
a 10-point scale (1/”Not at all” to 10/”Severely”) to measure severity along five 
axes: (1) interference with ability to study for class; (2) detraction from ability 
and desire to learn; (3) reduction in class participation; (4) production of 
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in  UCLA  Law’s  commitment to  equal treatment for  all students.  Constant 
across every measure, incidents had a greater impact on Students of Color. 
	  
(1) Degree to which the incident interfered with the student’s ability to study 
for class. 
Incidents were far less likely to interfere with a White student’s ability to 
study for class than a Student of Color’s ability to study for class. Of the 16 
White respondents, 50% reported that the incident had no effect at all, and 94% 
rated the effect between 1-3 on the severity scale. The mean for White 
respondents was 1.9. In contrast, responses from Students of Color (N = 34) 
produced a near uniform distribution across the severity scale, with an overall 
mean of 5.6. Twenty-six percent of Students of Color described an incident as a 
1-3 on the severity scale, 47% rated incidents between 4-7, and 26% scored an 
incident between 8-10. 
	  
	  
How greatly did this incident interfere with your ability to study for class? 
	  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Total  Mean 
	  
SoC 2 4 3 2 6 4 4 4 2 3 34 5.6 
	  





(2) Degree to which the incident(s) detracted from the student’s ability and 
desire to learn. 
White students who experienced such an incident were far less likely than 
Students of Color to report they suffered a diminished ability and desire to 
learn. Among White respondents (N = 16), 75% reported that the incident 
affected their desire to learn “Not at all,” and 94% of White students reported 
that  the  event  was  at  most  a  3  in  severity.  The  mean  score  for  White 
respondents was 1.7. In contrast, responses of Students of Color (N = 34) 
revealed a relatively uniform distribution across the severity scale and a mean 
of 5.1. Thirty-five percent of Students of Color indicated incidents were a 1-3 
on the scale, 35% scored incidents between 4-7, and 29% rated incidents 
between 8-10. 
	  
How greatly did this incident(s) detract from your ability and desire to 
learn? 
	  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10   Total  Mean 
	  
SoC 4 5 3 4 3 5 0 4 4 2 34 4.9 
	  












(3) Degree to which the incident(s) caused the student to participate less in 
class. 
Although incidents caused all students to participate less in class, the 
effect was far more severe on Students of Color. Of the 16 White respondents, 
63% reported a severity score of 1-3. Unlike in previous severity inquiries, 
multiple White students reported scores greater than 5 on the severity scale, 
with an overall mean of 3.7 (median = 2). This relative increase in severity 
appeared in Students of Color’s responses as well. Sixty-seven percent of 
Students of Color (N = 34) reported a score greater than 5 on the severity scale, 
with an overall mean of 6.8. Perhaps most notable, 32% of Students of Color 
reported a 10 on the severity scale. 
	  
	  
How greatly did this incident(s) cause you to participate less in class? 
	  
1  2  3  4  5  6   7  8  9  10   Total   Mean 
	  
SoC                 3       0     5    3    0    2    3     3   3    11     33         6.8 
	  
White              7      2     1    0    1    1    2    0    0      2      16        3.7 
	  
	  
(4) Degree to which the incident(s) caused the student to feel emotional 
distress, embarrassment or shame? 
Nearly paralleling the previous item on class participation, responses 
revealed that incidents disproportionately impacted the emotional and 
psychological well-being of Students of Color. Seventy-five percent of White 
respondents (N = 16) reported a severity score of 1-3, and 12% described 
incidents as a 10. The mean for White respondents was 3.3 (median = 2). In 
contrast, 60% of Students of Color (N = 34) reported a score between 7-10, 
with an overall mean of 6.3 (median = 7). 
	  
	  
How  greatly  did  this  incident(s)  cause  you  to  feel  emotional  distress, 
embarrassment or shame? 
	  
1  2  3  4   5   6   7    8   9   10   Total  Mean 
	  
SoC 2 3 3 1 2 3 8 3 5 4 34 6.3 
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(5) Degree to which the incident caused the student to doubt UCLA Law’s 
commitment to equal treatment for all students. 
A student’s race correlated with the degree to which the incident impacted 
her perception of the administration’s commitment to equal treatment. Sixty 
percent of White students (N = 15) reported that the incident had little to no 
impact on their perception of the administration. The overall mean for White 
respondents was 3.9 (median = 3). In contrast, only 9% of Students of Color (N 
= 33) reported that the incident had little or no impact. Fifty-nine percent of 
Students of Color reported a score between 8-10, with an overall mean of 7.3 
(median = 8). 
	  
How  greatly  did  this  incident(s)  cause  you  to  doubt  UCLA  Law’s 
commitment to equal treatment for all students? 
	  
	  
1  2  3   4  5  6    7  8  9  10   Total  Mean 
	  
SoC 1 2 1 2 3 2 2 5 7 8 33 7.3 
	  
White  5  2   2  1  1  0   1  1  0  2  15  3.9 
	  
	  
5. Qualitative Responses.173 
In addition to quantitative survey items, the DAC Survey concluded with 
a survey item that allowed students to provide open-ended responses. Fifty 
respondents provided a qualitative response. The qualitative responses reflect 
that same perceptive divergence that appeared throughout the quantitative 
portion of the survey. Illustrative of this perceptive divergence, the majority of 
responses either explicitly emphasized or expressly denied the existence of 
racial unevenness at UCLA Law. 
	  
(1)  Discussion 
Findings from the DAC Survey are consistent with twenty years 
of research on campus racial climate.174 Perhaps most notable is the degree to 
which perceptions about existing diversity, racial unevenness, and classroom 
climate  sharply  diverged  along  racial  lines.  Paralleling  past  studies  in  the 
undergraduate context, Students of Color at UCLA Law were far more likely 
than their White colleagues to perceive UCLA Law as a racially hostile 
environment. Students of Color experienced far greater levels of stigma 
consciousness175  than their White colleagues. Unlike the majority of Students 
	  
	  
173. Qualitative responses on file with Author. 
174. See supra Part I.B.ii (discussing campus racial climate, racial microaggressions and 
stereotype threat). 
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of Color who feel marked by their racial identity, the survey revealed that 
White  UCLA  Law  students  overwhelmingly  proceed  through  law  school 
without ever consciously thinking about their own whiteness.176 
As anticipated, levels of stigma consciousness diverged among non-White 
racial groups. Although generalizing across the student body may be difficult 
due  to  the  small  sample   size,  clear  divergence  existed  among  actual 
respondents. Asian-American students demonstrated a larger stigma 
consciousness than White students; however, they reported a lower level of 
stigma consciousness than Latina/o and Black students. Further research is 
recommended in order to obtain a more robust sense of the differing levels of 
stigma consciousness across racial groups. 
Students  of  Color  were  more  likely  than  their  White  colleagues  to 
perceive the law school as lacking student body racial diversity. There are at 
least two possible explanations for this result. Students of Color might enter 
law school with a different baseline regarding what constitutes racial diversity. 
In other words, Students of Color and White students may not diverge in their 
perception of actual numbers of bodies, but rather diverge in their definition of 
racial diversity. Alternatively, race may dictate the way in which students 
perceive the relative number of White and nonwhite bodies in the law school. 
One unexpected observation was the degree to which the perception of 
women tracked that of Students of Color. In nearly every perception item, 
responses from women and Students of Color tracked closely together. This 
result prompted the belief that women of Color may have been overrepresented 
in the respondent pool, thus skewing results. Subsequent analysis of the 
respondent pool revealed that this was not the case. This finding suggests that 
the  responses  of  White  women  and  White  men  consistently  diverged.  A 
potential explanation for this divergence is that White women, though they do 
not experience racial unevenness, are more likely to have dealt with gender 
unevenness  in  their  own  lives.  This  personal  experience  may make  White 
women more likely to appreciate racial unevenness, even if they do not 
personally experience it. 
Beyond perception, the DAC Survey revealed that the campus racial 
climate at UCLA Law exacts a disproportionately severe toll on Students of 
Color. These findings provide support for the claim that Students of Color at 
UCLA Law do not travel down the same river or run on the same track as their 
White counterparts. Rather, their route is packed with a variety of race- 
dependent obstacles. Disaggregating non-White racial groups revealed that 
routes differ even among Students of Color. Although the sample size was 




176. Such moments are most likely to occur when race is explicitly discussed; when 
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traverse the most difficult route at UCLA Law. We suggest further research to 
determine the more generalizable validity of this initial finding. 
Overall, the findings conclusively show that racial unevenness exists at 
UCLA Law. Not only are Students of Color more likely than White students to 
perceive a negative racial climate, they are also far more likely to be victims of 
a racially hostile incident. The effects of such incidents are far more severe for 
Students of Color. Although these findings may paint a negative image of 
campus racial climate, it should not be forgotten that students expressed near 
universal support for racial diversity and administrative responses to incidents 




The DAC Survey provides a new dimension to previous research on racial 
unevenness in higher education. With a focus on the campus racial climate at 
UCLA Law, the DAC Survey reveals that hostile classroom climate is not 
limited to the undergraduate level. Racial unevenness and its concomitant 
burdens  are  a  reality  for  Students  of  Color  at  UCLA  Law.  We  should 
understand, however, that UCLA Law is likely far from unique in this regard. 
Similar to the undergraduate level, there is reason to believe that racial 
unevenness is endemic across law schools. 
The DAC Survey’s unambiguous results should be sufficient to warrant an 
institutional response. In order to prove an intervention to prove successful, the 
prescription must track the diagnosis. Thus, having diagnosed the problem as a 
racially hostile environment and an unequal learning environment, the response 
must   focus   on   broad,   institutional   change.   Four   recommendations   are 
provided.177 
(1) Engage in robust institutional learning.178 As with any other study, the 
DAC Survey can only tell us so much. Even as a limited device, the DAC 
Survey provided a wealth of information about student experience at UCLA 
Law. We have learned that Students of Color experience law school in ways 
fundamentally different than their White colleagues. This information is now 
available  to  guide  institutional  decision-making  in  the  realm  of  classroom 
climate and learning environment. However, the DAC Survey only scratched 
the   surface.   It   is   thus   recommended   that   tools   capable   of   producing 
	  
	  
177.    These recommendations are framed with respect to UCLA Law because the DAC 
Survey was administered at UCLA Law. However, the recommendations are in no way unique to 
one law school. Although the characteristics of each law school will dictate the precise contours of 
any particular intervention, we believe that these four recommendations should translate to most 
law schools in the country. 
178. See generally Georgia L. Bauman, Promoting Organizational Learning in Higher 
Education to Achieve Equity in Educational Outcomes, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION 22–35 (Adrianna Kezar, 2005) (arguing that enhanced institutional learning is a key 
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organizational learning, such as the DAC Survey and similar instruments, 
become permanent fixtures at UCLA Law. 
(2) Hire more faculty members interested in supporting student well-being 
and improving racial classroom climate. Currently, only a small selection of 
staff and faculty at UCLA Law engage in a form of informal mentoring that 
helps students navigate the racial unevenness of law school. This mentoring, 
which serves an essential institutional function by combating the emotional and 
psychological  harms  flowing  from  racial  unevenness,  goes  largely 
unrecognized and uncompensated by the institution. 
To avoid concerns about formalizing new responsibilities, institutions 
should reconceptualize notions of merit in the faculty hiring process to 
encompass this “mentor” characteristic. By focusing on a candidate’s ability to 
“mentor” students, institutions need not worry about the hiring criterion taking 
on  a  race-conscious  dimension.179   Although  it  is  possible  that  a  larger 
percentage of prospective Faculty of Color would exhibit interest or ability to 
serve such a function, race need not be a prerequisite. Thus, public institutions 
such as UCLA Law should not hesitate for the fear of engaging in a potentially 
prohibited form of race-consciousness. 
(3) Admit more Students of Color. As the literature revealed, numerical 
underrepresentation  plays  a  role  in  the  manifestation  and  maintenance  of 
racially hostile environments. Increasing the number of Students of Color will 
improve the learning environment. Some may disregard this recommendation 
as a naïve desire to circumvent prohibitions against race-conscious admissions. 
There are many arguments why admissions offices should reduce reliance of 
the LSAT; however, increasing the number of Student of Color admits does not 
necessitate rejecting the current practice. Growing evidence that the LSAT 
undermeasures   the   talent   of   negatively   stereotyped   groups   provides   a 
compelling  argument  that  our  current  admissions  system is  far  from race- 
neutral.180 Thus, instead of eliminating any reliance on the LSAT, Admissions 
offices or the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) should begin correcting 
for this mismeasurement, which effectively exacts a race-conscious harm on 





179.    It is arguable that faculty hiring criteria should become race-conscious in a variety of 
ways. See, e.g., Kang, Fair Measures, supra note 1 (explaining that faculty of color may serve the 
role of debiasing agents); cf. Kennedy, supra note 24. Recognizing a “mentor” orientation as a 
component of merit need not be race-conscious. However, it should be noted that in places where 
informal mentoring occurs, the majority of individuals providing this support are often People of 
Color. 
180. See Feingold, supra note 1 (arguing that law schools should rescale LSAT scores so 
as to avoid under measuring the talent of Black and Latina/o students); Walton et al., supra note 1 
(reviewing a wealth of data supporting the notion that the LSAT under measures the talent of 
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(4) Change the internal conversation. We must stop asking what is wrong 
with our students. Constant retreat to this notion misreads the ailment and 
reinforces negative stereotypes about Students of Color in our institutions. 
Instead of citing students as the source of the problem, we must refocus our 
attention on the failings of our educational institutions. Our inability to create 
learning environments that allow all students to compete on the same track is a 
powerful impediment to realizing healthy racial campus climates. 
We believe that concerted efforts to realize any of these recommendations 
will produce tangible benefits within any institution. As always, the ability to 
identify the correct prescription and actually implement it is always easier said 
than done. Still, the challenge should not prevent us from taking steps to realize 
the goal of producing educational institutions that treat all of our students 
equally. 
